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THE BONES OF A BUDDHA AND THE BUSINESS OF A MONK:
CONSERVATIVE MONASTIC VALUES IN AN EARLY
MAHĀYĀNA POLEMICAL TRACT

There is nothing very distinguished about the *Maitreyamahāsiṃhanāda-sūtra*. It appears to be just another of a long list of little known mahāyāna *sūtras* that have no particular context and had no demonstrable importance in the history of Indian Buddhism. It appears not to have been quoted or even referred to in learned Indian mahāyāna sources and there is no evidence that it was ever significant there.¹ It is therefore not surprising, perhaps, that it is almost equally unknown in modern secondary sources, although it has at least been occasionally cited. Demiéville has, for example, summarized, paraphrased, and occasionally translated significant parts of the second half of the *Maitreyamahāsiṃhanāda-sūtra* in his entry on “images” in the *Hōbōgirin*.² He has also at least alluded to this same text in an interesting paper entitled “L’iconoclasme anti-bouddhique en Chine”;³ but in neither place does he even suggest that the text was well known or significant. More recently Zürcher, in a paper covering much the same ground as Demiéville had, has translated two short passages from, again, the second half of the text, and, again, without being able to show that either was of any particular importance.⁴ Apart from these published sources, at least one recent unpublished dissertation makes several references to our text and translates several more passages from it.⁵ But other than this very little seems to have been said about the text, and very little seems to be known about it.

Although it appears to have had two different titles, there was apparently only one translation of the *Maitreyamahāsiṃhanāda-sūtra* into Chinese. It now forms part of the *Ratnakūṭa* that was compiled by Bodhiruci in the early eighth century (Taishō 310, no. 23), but was apparently translated already in the mid-sixth century by a gentleman – said to have been the son of a King of Ujjayinī in Central India – whose name cannot be reconstructed with certainty: the *Hōbōgirin* catalog gives it as “Upaśūnya (?) ou plutôt Ūrdhvaśūnya (?)”⁶

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There is also a Tibetan translation of the text which in the *Kanjur* is entitled *byams pa'i seng ge'i sgra chen po mdo* = *Maitreyamahāsimhanāda-sūtra*.⁷ In most 'editions', it seems, the translators are given as Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi, Prajñāvarman and Ye šes sde, and this would place it, of course, at the beginning of the 9th century. The translation seems to be already listed in the Ldan Kar catalog as no. 47 under the slightly shorter title *byams pa seng ge'i sgra* = *Maitreyasimhanāda*, and Bu-ston still uses this shorter title (*byams pa seng ge'i sgra'i mdo*) when he quotes two sets of verses from our text at the beginning of his *Chos 'byung*.⁸ Like the Chinese version, the Tibetan version of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* also now forms a part of a *Ratnakūṭa*.

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Given how little is known about the *Maitreyasimhanāda*, and given the fact – already noted – that it appears to have been even less known in India and to have had no particular impact on the history of Buddhism there, it is not altogether clear that rescuing it from what might be a well deserved obscurity could be counted as a positive contribution to scholarship: surely we do not need another convoluted argument that tries to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. But even apart from the details that will be discussed below, it is virtually certain that if the history of Buddhism in India is ever to be even imperfectly understood it will be necessary to study not only its successes, but also its apparent failures. And, as we will see, the *Maitreyasimhanāda* seems to be one such failure that is particularly worthy of study. A number of things would seem to recommend it.

First of all the contents of at least a part of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* recommend it as an object worth some study. Zürcher, perhaps somewhat inelegantly, has described the *Maitreyasimhanāda* as "a typical *sūnyavāda* scripture",⁹ and it is certainly true that there are scores of similar texts, and that the authors of at least this sort of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature were apparently slow to realize that you cannot talk about emptiness very long before you start repeating yourself. But it is also true that Zürcher's characterization applies much more accurately to the first half of the text than to the second. In fact Zürcher himself – like Demiéville before him – appears to have been drawn to the text not by what it said about emptiness, but rather by what it had to say about 'images'. And what it said about images was unusual.

The author of the second half of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* – who may or may not have been the author of the first half as well¹⁰ – was not,

it seems, so concerned with images themselves as he was with how he thought they were being used by “some” monks. He says, for example, or rather has the Buddha say:

Kāśyapa, there will be some monks (*dge slong ... kha cig*) in the last time, the last period, in the final five hundred years, who have not developed (*ma bsgoms pa*) the body, have not developed the mind, have not developed good conduct, have not developed wisdom. They will paint (*'dri bar 'gyur zhing*) images of the Tathāgata (*de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gzugs dag*) on cotton cloth (*ras bcos bu = dūśya*), on walls and in enclosures (*ra ba dag gi ngos la*) and they will simply intend to make a living through them (*de dag gis 'tsho bar sems par yang 'gyur te*); they will be proud of themselves and boast on account of that business (*las*), and they will despise and disparage others.¹¹

Demiéville, in summarizing such passages, says that the Buddha of our *sūtra* “condamne les candidats à l'Éveil [i.e. bodhisattvas – we will return to this] qui fabriquent des images pour en faire commerce”; Zürcher calls the practice referred to here “simony”.¹² Whatever you call it, what the Buddha is here made to ‘predict’ about the use of images by monks is certainly not common in canonical Buddhist literature, and certainly worth further study.¹³ This is especially so since what appear to be contemporary *Vinaya* sources contain elaborate rules prescribing monastic image processions and the proper procedures for dealing with the wealth of donations they produce,¹⁴ and since what appear to be contemporary inscriptions like those of the Bhikṣu Bala seem to record the activities of a prominent and learned monk engaged in what can legitimately be called the ‘promotion’ of the cult of images.¹⁵ In fact when viewed in light of this other material it becomes possible to seriously suggest that these sections of the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* might well represent an actual mahāyāna polemic aimed at mainstream monastic practice – and the “bodhisattvas” who engaged in it – in the Kuṣān period. The further fact that the polemical position taken by the *Maitreyasimhanāda* appears to have failed, that monastic involvement with images did not decrease but actually increased after the Kuṣān period,¹⁶ does not necessarily render that position less interesting. It simply defines it as marginal, and that in itself is a gain: we might know where it finally fits.

However interesting the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* against monks making a living with images might be, it cannot be pursued here. It requires and deserves separate treatment.¹⁷ Here we need first to note what neither Demiéville nor Zürcher did: in addition to – in fact preceding – the polemic on the use of images by monks the *Maitreyasimhanāda* also has a very similar polemic against monks who make a living from the relic cult. This polemic we will look at in

some detail. We also need to note that this polemic on relics – like the polemic on images – has some linkages with material that is external to the *Maitreyasimhanāda* itself, material that may in fact allow us to date and geographically locate if not the text, at least some key conceptions and elements of the vocabulary found in it.

Although, for example, the date of the Chinese translation of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* would not seem to suggest it, there are some good reasons for thinking that at least the polemics it contains might legitimately be described as ‘early’; and might represent an ‘old’ stratum of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature. Some of these reasons are – as already noted – external to the text; some internal. If we begin with the latter, the first thing that is immediately obvious is that the term *mahāyāna* appears nowhere in the text of these polemics, and recent scholarship is beginning to assert that the presence or absence of this term has chronological significance. Durt, for example, has said in a recent overview of the state of our ignorance in regard to ‘the Mahāyāna’ that “une analyse des plus anciennes traductions chinoises de *sūtra* de G[rand] V[éhicule] et des textes sanskrits des *Mahāyāna-sūtra* censés appartenir aux strates doctrinaux les plus anciens aboutit au même résultat: il semble que les termes Mahāyāna et Daijō ne se soient imposés que lentement”, and that “Le G[rand] V[éhicule] lui-même est longtemps désigné par des périphrases . . . ”¹⁸

One such “paraphrase” does occur in our polemics – though rarely – and that may be significant. But surely as significant is the way that it is used. We have already seen that in summarizing the polemical passages in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* that are directed at those monks who make a living from images Demiéville says the Buddha “condamne les candidats à l’Éveil [i.e. bodhisattvas] qui fabriquent des images pour en faire commerce”. The particular passage that Demiéville is referring to comes at the end of the polemic on images, and the wording of the corresponding passage in the Tibetan version is a bit more precise. The Tibetan text says:

‘od srungs yang phyi ma’i tshe phyi ma’i dus lnga brgya pa tha ma la / byang chub sems dpa’i theg pa pa’i rigs kyi bu dang rigs kyi bu mo thabs la mi mkhas pa / brkam pa / ‘dod pas zil gyis non pa kha cig ‘byung bar ‘gyur te / de dag ni ras bcos bu dang rtsig ngos la bris pa’am / de bzhiin gshegs pa’i sku gzugs gzan dag la mchod pa byas pas / dngos grub dang rdzu ‘phrul ‘thob par sems shing / de dag ‘di snyam du bdag cag ni de bzhiin gshegs pa la mchod pa byed pa yin gyi / gzhan dag ni mchod pa byed pa ma yin no snyam du rlom sems su ‘ang ‘gyur te / de dag dge ba cung zad tsam po des bdag la bstod par byed / gzhan la smod par byed cing / gzhi des ‘tsho bar sems par yang ‘gyur ro /’¹⁹

Kāśyapa, there will be some sons and daughters of good family who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattva-yānika*, -yānīya) in the last time, in the

last period, in the final five hundred years, who are not skilled in means, greedy, and overcome by desire. They will intend to obtain success and magical power through performing worship to images of the Tathāgata painted on cotton cloth and walls, or other images of the Tathāgata. They will think, 'we indeed are performing worship to the Tathāgatas but no one else is', and so thinking will be arrogant. On account of this meager good they will boast of themselves and disparage others, intending only to make a living by their activities.

Here, then, when we actually get a group designation like 'mahāyāna' – in fact *bodhisattvayāna* or *-yānika* is supposed to be one of the early "paraphrases" of the latter – it turns out that at least "some" members of this group are – far from being paragons of 'right' practice – the actual targets of the intended criticism. Moreover, if this 'prediction' at the end of the polemic on the use of images looks familiar, that is because it should: it forms a pair with and is a companion-piece to the parallel 'prediction' that occurs at the beginning of the same polemic, and the latter – as we have seen – directs its criticism towards "some monks . . . who have not developed the body, have not developed the mind etc. . . ." In other words, if this is a mahāyāna polemic it is directed either at two groups – "some monks" and "some sons and daughters of good family who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas" – or it is directed at a single group that can be described as either "some monks" or as "some adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas". If the first alternative holds, then the two groups, though designated differently, were thought to be doing the same thing and engaging in the same practice. If the second holds, then the 'two' were actually one and the same. Something very similar appears when we look at the polemic on the use of relics.

The two polemics found now in the second half of the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda-sūtra* are both built on the same basic armature and have the same basic structure. Both begin and end with a 'prediction' about conditions in "the last time". In both these two predictions frame a story of the past which carries the bulk of the polemic.²⁰ The opening 'prediction' in the polemic on relics²¹ concerns the appearance in "the last time" of "sham bodhisattvas" (*byang chub sems dpa' tshul 'chos*) who are further described as bodhisattvas "who have been taken hold of by bad friends, are destitute of determination, and interest themselves only in food and clothing" (*sdig pa'i grogs pos yongs su zin cing lhag pa'i bsam pa nyam chun ste / zas dang gos lhur len pa'i byang chub sems dpa'*). These are the bad guys, those who are further said to reject *yoga*, religious exertion (*prahāṇa*), exposition (*uddeśa*) and recitation (*svādhyāya*) – all the works of a monk – and instead to engage in the worship of relics for the sake of making a living.²² But

the concluding ‘prediction’, which presumably would be referring to the same group, describes them differently, although in a way that will be at least partly familiar. In the concluding ‘prediction’ those who engage in the worship of relics simply to ensure a livelihood are not described as “sham bodhisattvas” who have rejected a standard list of a monk’s activities, but rather as “some monks who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas *and* (some who are) adherents of the Vehicle of Disciples who have not developed the body, have not developed the mind, have not developed good conduct, have not developed wisdom” (. . . *byang chub sems dpa’i theg pa pa dang / nyan thos kyi theg pa pa’i dge slong lus ma bsgoms pa / sems ma bsgoms pa / tshul khrims ma bsgoms pa / shes rab ma bsgoms pa kha cig . . .*)²³ This characterization in the concluding ‘prediction’ in regard to the use of relics is, of course, very near to that found in the opening ‘prediction’ in regard to images cited above, but it is still at least a little unexpected. In fact the whole situation here is.

One might legitimately expect that polemics in a mahāyāna text – which the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda* at least now is – would be directed, as they frequently are, at a well defined non-mahāyāna opponent, but that is not what we seem to see here. There are group designations of a sort here, but they do not appear to be ‘sectarian’ in any significant sense, and they do not even seem to be strongly drawn. What we seem to be seeing – perhaps most clearly in the polemic on the use of relics – is a criticism by one group of monks, represented by the author of our polemics, directed at two other groups of monks – ‘some’ of those who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas, and ‘some’ of those who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Disciples – who are engaging in the same practices for the same motive. The adherence to one or another ‘vehicle’ is not an issue for our author anywhere in these polemics.²⁴ He is taking issue with the behavior of “some” monks regardless of their affiliation. He is not trying to define a mahāyāna over against something else. He is trying, above all else, to draw a clear distinction between what he thinks – and presumably what he wants his reader to think – is a good monk, and what he thinks is a bad monk. He is arguing, in other words, for a particular definition of what a monk is and what a monk should do. Although – as will be evident in what follows – he occasionally does use a conceptual vocabulary that we would call ‘mahāyāna’, he is most certainly not arguing for the rejection of what he understands as the monastic ideal, but for its full implementation; he is not arguing for the rejection of monasticism, but for its reform.

The mahāyāna is, of course, not normally considered to have been preoccupied with the problem of prescribing rules of behavior for monks – this is supposed to be the concern of *Vinaya* texts, and the mahāyāna did not have any of these. The fact remains, however, that it is difficult to read our polemics as anything else than an attempt to do just that. And the fact too remains that in his attempt to define what he seems to have thought was proper monastic behavior the author of our polemics actually uses elements of a vocabulary that is found in what appears to be a contemporary *Vinaya* source.

In, for example, what is certainly one of the least subtle passages in his polemic on monks who involve themselves in the relic cult to attract donations our author says of, again, “some monks who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas and (some who are) adherents of the Vehicle of Disciples”:

...still these dullards (*mi blun po*), when they have entered into the religious life in this Order (*bstan pa 'di la rab tu byung nas*), abandon and reject the (true) occupation of a religious (*dge sbyong gi las*) which I have declared, and, for the sake of sustaining themselves, for the sake of cultivating the houses of friends and houses that give alms, for the sake of acquiring bowls and robes, for the sake of getting acquisitions (*myed pa*) and honors, for the sake of obtaining renown, reputation and fame, they provide (*nye bar sgrub par byed do*) honor to the relics and *stūpas* of the Tathāgata with acts of worship and honor directed toward both.

But what then, Kāśyapa, is the occupation of a religious (*dge sbyong gi las*)? They are, Kāśyapa, the two occupations of meditation and recitation which I have taught (*'od srungs ngas las gnyis po bsam gtan dang kha ton bya ba bstan pa gang dag yin pa dag ste*)²⁵

Fortunately, we have some idea of how the final sentence here would have looked in Sanskrit because the author of our polemic almost certainly did not invent either the idea expressed or the basic vocabulary used to do so.

In, for example, the *Cūḍāpakṣāvadāna*, now found in the *Divyāvadāna*, when Mahāpanthaka enters the Order, the monk who admitted him immediately says to him: *dve bhikṣukarmaṇī dhyānam adhyayanam ca kiṃ kariṣyasi*: “There are two occupations for a monk, meditation and recitation. Which will you do?”²⁶ And the *Cūḍāpakṣāvadāna* is, of course, an adaptation – even more crude and clumsy than the cases Shackleton Bailey studied –²⁷ of a text that forms a part of the *Vinayavibhaṅga* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. There the corresponding passage reads: *dge slong gi las ni gnyis te / bsam gtan dang / klog pa yin na khyod bsam gtan dang / klog pa gang 'dod* /.²⁸ This assertion that there are two occupations for a monk is in fact something of a common-place in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. It occurs repeatedly throughout its *Vibhaṅga* in contexts similar to that

found in the *Cūḍāpakṣāvadāna* and in almost exactly the same form.²⁹ It also occurs in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* where it is used in an interesting way, and there is a reasonably good chance that the author of our polemic might have known something like this usage since he seems to be simply repeating it.

Our polemist may not have been doing anything very novel when – through the mouth of the Buddha – he charged the monks he did not approve of with abandoning and rejecting the two occupations of a religious which had been taught by the Buddha himself. The redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* had also – and perhaps already – deployed much the same rhetorical strategy against forms of monastic behavior that they too, presumably, did not wish to see continued. When, for example, in the *Kṣudrakavastu*, the monk Kāśyapa – the same Kāśyapa who is the chief interlocutor of our polemics – catches the monk Nanda painting a picture of his lovely wife's body on a rock he says:

“What are you doing, Venerable Nanda?”

Nanda said: “Reverend Mahākāśyapa, I am painting Subhadrā.”

Kāśyapa then responds with what can be imagined as some disgust:

“Venerable, when the Blessed One has said: ‘there are two occupations for a monk, meditation and recitation’, how can you sit here painting pictures of your wife?!”
(*tshe dang ldan pa bcom ldan ‘das kyis dge slong gi bya ba ni gnyis te / bsam gtan dang gdon pa’o zhes gsungs na / khyod rang gi chung ma ‘dri zhing ‘dug gam*)³⁰

Simply put, Kāśyapa in this instance is made to invoke the words of the Buddha in regard to the two (acceptable) occupations of a monk to criticize behavior which, presumably, the redactors of this *Vinaya* did not approve of and which, significantly, the Buddha himself is then made to forbid: “Monks”, the Buddha is made to say, “it is with thoughts of passion towards Subhadrā that Nanda, a deluded man, paints pictures. Therefore, a monk must not paint pictures. If a monk were to paint pictures he would come to be guilty of an offence.” Although later in the same text the rule is emended so that it only applies to the forms of living things (*sems can gyi gzugs ni bri bar mi bya’o*), still the point is clear: those things that do not fall under the heading of the two occupations are condemned by the Buddha.

But the redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* also used the same assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk in attempts, presumably, to curb other forms of monastic behavior which they seem to have judged unacceptable. In yet another text in the *Kṣudrakavastu*, for example, when the Buddha declares the five benefits or blessings (*anuśamsa*) that come from sweeping, all the Elder Monks (*sthaviras*) abandon meditation and recitation (*bsam gtan dang ‘don pa bor te*) and start

sweeping the Jetavana. But, the text says, the Buddha himself then had to immediately curb this particular enthusiasm and correct the situation. He did so by saying, according to the redactors of this *Vinaya*:

“What I said referred to the monk in charge of physical properties (*upadhivārika*), not to every single Elder Monk. On the contrary, the occupation of the monk who has entered the Order of this well-spoken Dharma and Discipline is twofold, to wit: meditation and recitation” (*ngas dge skos las dgongs te gsungs kyi / dge slong gnas brtan gnas brtan dag ni ma yin no / ‘on kyang legs par gsungs pa’i chos ‘dul ba la rab tu byung ba’i dge slong gi las ni gnyis te / ‘di lta ste / bsam gtan dang ‘don pa’o /*)³¹

It is probably difficult for some to fully realize what the problem is here. Suffice it to say that in brahmanical India where such activities as sweeping were undertaken only by the lowest castes and servants it simply would not do to have senior monks engaging in them. In any case, the *vinayadharas* who compiled the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* are once again seen here invoking the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk to deal with what must have been considered an inappropriate form of monastic behavior.

These *vinaya* passages would seem to present clear parallels, then, for both what the author of our polemics is in part saying and for what in part he is doing. Both ‘mahāyāna’ polemic and mainstream monastic code seem to be using basically the same *specific* language. In both this language seems to be deployed against forms of monastic behavior which the author of the polemic and the redactors of the code did not approve of. Since the intention of the redactors of the code was almost by definition to govern, structure, or reform the behavior of monks, this too – however much it might seem to be out of character – must also have been the intention of at least the polemical parts of what is now a mahāyāna *sūtra*. There remains, however, the problem of how to further describe the situation. If, for example, the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* predates the polemics in the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda-sūtra* then it could be argued – perhaps even be concluded – that the author of these mahāyāna polemics simply took over a standard *vinaya* argument and applied it, or adapted it, to yet another form, real or potential, of what he considered errant monastic practice. In other words, the specificity of the parallels between polemic and code – especially the close verbal parallels – almost inevitably raises the question of the exact relationship between the two.³² And this question becomes even more pressing, perhaps, in light of the fact that the close verbal parallels already pointed out between the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda-sūtra* and the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* are not the only ones that seem to occur.

It has already been briefly noted that the opening ‘prediction’ in the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* on the use of relics refers to those who worship relics for the sake of making a living as “sham bodhisattvas”. These “sham bodhisattvas” are also described as under the influence of bad friends, devoid of determination, and interested only in food and clothing. But even this may not be the worst the author of our polemic had to say about such individuals – he may have saved that for last, when he had the Buddha say:

“I, Kāśyapa, in the presence of the world with its gods, have said: ‘You, monks, must continue with efforts that are applied to disciplining yourselves and calming. Since there are brahmins and householders who are devout, they will perform the worship of relics for my relics!’ But in spite of this, look, Kāśyapa, how these dullards, when they have even given up *yoga*, even given up religious exertion, even given up exposition, even given up recitation, will make efforts in acts of worship of relics and, supporting themselves on those, intend only to make a living!” (*od srungs ngas lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyi mdun du dge slong dag khyed cag ni bdag nyid dul ba dang zhi bar sbyor ba'i rjes su brston pas gnas par gyis shig / bram ze dang khyim bdag dad pa dang ldan pa dag yod na de dag ni nga'i sku gdung rnams la sku gdung gi mchod pa byed par 'gyur ro zhes de skad gsungs na / 'od srungs mi blun po de dag rnal 'byor kyang spangs / spong ba 'ang spangs / lung nod pa 'ang spangs / kha ton bya ba 'ang spangs nas / de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung gi mchod pa'i las la brston par 'gyur zhing / de dag la brten nas 'tsho bar sems par byed pa de dag la ltos /*)³³

There are, of course, a number of interesting things about this passage, not the least of which is the fact that its author seems to have the Buddha quote a version of the instructions he himself gave to Ānanda in regard to his own body in his final days.³⁴ But for our more immediate purposes what we need to note is that another part of what the Buddha is here made to say looks very much like a variant version of yet another formula which is frequently found in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, a formula which is once again consistently associated with monks turning away from their ‘proper’ activities.

In the *Cīvaravastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, for example, in a case of some significance for *Mūlasarvāstivādin* monastic inheritance law, when the monks of Śrāvastī are confronted with a long and ongoing series of claims on a very considerable estate left by the monk Upananda they end up doing nothing else than dealing with the estate; i.e. they no longer perform the normal and expected activities of a monk. This is expressed by the formula: *bhikṣavaḥ . . . riñcanti uddeśam pāṭham svādhyāyaṃ yogaṃ manasikāram (dge slong rnams . . . lung nod pa dang / klog pa dang / 'don pa dang / yid la byed pa bor ba)*, “The monks give up exposition, reading, recitation, *yoga* and mental concentration”.³⁵ Likewise in the *Śayanāsanavastu* when the Buddha praises dwelling in the forest (*āraṇyakatva*), and some monks (*kecid bhikṣava*) take up

residence there, thieves steal all their possessions and those monks are reduced to spending all their time trying to get robes from the laity. This state of affairs is also expressed by exactly the same formula in Sanskrit, though in this instance the Tibetan renders it by *lung mnod pa dang / klag pa dang / gnod pa dang / rnal 'byor dang / yid la bya ba nyams par gyur pa*.³⁶ The same formula is also used again, for example, in the *Kṣudrakavastu* to describe what happens when the monks of Śrāvastī are – because of activities of the group of six – completely preoccupied by fears of being (falsely) accused of faults. As a result of their anxiety (*bag tsha*) the text says, “they came to be haggard, worn out, exhausted and physically incapable of work” (*lus las su ma rung bar gyur te*). But more importantly for us, they are also described as *lung ston pa dang / klog pa dang / kha ton dang / rnal 'byor dang / nang gi tshul bzhin yid la byed pa dag shor nas . . .*, “having abandoned exposition, reading, recitation, *yoga*, and inner mental concentration . . .”, of having, in effect, ceased to function as monks.³⁷ In all such cases,³⁸ of course, the condition or situation described by the formula requires the intervention of the Buddha himself who then promulgates an appropriate rule designed to reverse what was clearly understood to be a very serious dereliction of monastic duties and highly undesirable state of affairs.

At the very least, then, these *Vinaya* passages would seem to make possible a much more precise reading of the corresponding remarks of the author of our polemic. They would seem to indicate that when he describes the “sham bodhisattvas” who engage in the relic cult to gain a livelihood as “dullards” who have given up *yoga*, religious exertion, exposition and recitation, he is in fact accusing them of having abandoned or fallen away from the practices of a monk, and he is using an established *vinaya* idiom to do so. Obviously, for the accusation to have force the individuals so charged must have been members of the monastic community. Conversely, it stands to reason that if the “sham bodhisattva” was, for the author of our polemic, one who abandoned the practices of a monk, the ‘good’ bodhisattva, the ‘authentic’ bodhisattva, was one who had not.

But, while these passages confirm the strong monastic orientation of our author – and there is a great deal of other evidence that does so – and while they provide yet another link between this ‘mahāyāna’ polemic and the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, they still do not explain those links, and the problem of the relationship between mahāyāna polemic and mainstream monastic code becomes even less easy to avoid: now there are two instances of shared vocabulary.³⁹ Given the specificity of

that shared vocabulary the most conventional approach would be, of course, to assume a kind of linearity and to assert both that one source must be earlier than the other, and that the latter must have borrowed from the former. And there is some internal evidence – especially in regard to the shared assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk – that would seem to point in this direction.

The assertion of the twofold occupation of a religious is delivered in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* as something that had already been said by the Buddha – ‘*od srungs ngas las gnyis po bsam gtan dang kha ton bya ba bstan pa gang dag yin pa*. That is to say, these words are not presented here as if they were being taught for the first time. The same, of course, holds for the passage in the *Kṣudrakavastu* where Kāśyapa quotes the assertion as already having been made: *bcom ldan ‘das kyis dge slong gi bya ba ni gnyis te / bsam gtan dang gdong pa’o zhes gsungs na* . . . The situation is different, however, in the second passage cited above from the *Kṣudraka*. There the assertion is delivered as original, as if it were being stated for the first time, and it is not impossible that this was indeed its original context.⁴⁰ Other elements of this *Kṣudraka* text are also frequently and widely quoted elsewhere in this *Vinaya*. The enumeration of the five blessings that come from sweeping that is certainly original to this text is also cited, for example, in the *Śayanāsanavastu* and the *Cīvaravastu*.⁴¹

But if considerations of this kind could be taken to argue for the priority of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* over the *Maitreyasimhanāda*, so too might the fact that both the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk and the formula describing the abandonment of monastic activities are well established and of wide occurrence in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, but such things appear to be rarely if ever found elsewhere in mahāyāna *sūtra* literature.⁴² And there is one other bit of internal evidence which would seem to suggest that at least the assertion of the twofold occupation is not original to the *Maitreyasimhanāda*: not only is the assertion not presented in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* as having been delivered there for the first time, it is also not presented there as the definitive or final word in regard to the matter. The assertion is not simply cited in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* and left to stand. The full passage reads:

But what then, Kāśyapa, is the occupation of a religious? They are, Kāśyapa, the two occupations of meditation and recitation which I have taught. But even these two occupations were only taught for the sake of setting out on the path. Even they are not the final and full conclusion. The occupation which sets out for the sake of exhausting all occupation – this is the occupation of a religious.

*'od srungs de la dge slong gi las gang zhe na / 'od srungs ngas las gnyis po bsam
gtan dang kha ton bya ba bstan pa gang dag yin pa dag ste / las de gnyis kyang
lam la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir bstan par zad kyi / de dag kyang shin tu mtha' thug
pa dang / shin tu mthar phyin pa ma yin no / 'od srungs las gang las zad par bya
ba'i phyir 'jug pa de ni dge sbyong gi las yin te /⁴³*

Seen in its full form, this presentation of the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk in the *Maitreyasimhanādasūtra* looks like nothing so much as a characteristic mahāyāna rehandling of received material. Given that the author of our polemic first has the Buddha cite what he had already said, then – in effect – immediately deny it, it would seem unduly difficult to argue that his passage represents the original context of the assertion and that the redactors of the *Vinaya* adapted their version from it. To argue the reverse would at least require less painful contortions, but to argue in one or another direction may also not be the only option.

Although the basic assertion of the twofold occupation and the description of the abandonment of monastic activities in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* and the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* are strikingly similar, they are not literally the same. One is not a direct quotation of the other. There are some noticeable differences. The *Maitreyasimhanāda* refers to the occupation of a religious (*dge sbyong gi las*), the *Vinaya* to that of a monk (*dge slong gi las*);⁴⁴ neither the individual monastic activities that are abandoned, nor the order of their enumeration are precisely the same in both: whereas the *Maitreyasimhanāda* has *prahāṇa*, the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* has *pāṭha*; while the former begins with *yoga*, in the latter this does not occur until the end.⁴⁵ Differences of this sort may, of course, be judged minor, but they may also represent just the sort of differences that one might expect to find in contemporary documents belonging to the same basic group, or to closely related competing groups. And this hypothesis might indeed account far better for the shared elements than does the always problematic and rarely provable invocation of direct borrowing. The assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk and the formulaic description of the abandonment of monastic activities may very well occur in both the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* and the *Maitreyasimhanādasūtra* not because one source was borrowing from the other, but because these formulations – and the problem that lays behind them both – were topics of discussion and debate at the time that both the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* and the texts in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* were being composed or redacted. The two sources may very well share material because they are roughly contemporaneous expressions of a common debate about the definition of a monk. They use a common language because in at least some

sense they were arguing with each other about a shared concern in regard to which there were a range of opinions – if each used only its own language they would only be talking to themselves. Moreover, if contemporaneity accounts more easily than direct borrowing for these shared elements, contemporaneity alone, it seems, can account for another instance where our polemic shares a specific vocabulary with yet another group of sources. But before moving on to that particular instance, it is necessary to note one further thing here.

Whether the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* borrowed important bits of its language from the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, or whether the two share elements of a common language because they are contemporary statements in a common debate – either way this would seem to have implications for the date of our polemic. If the author of our polemic is borrowing from the *Vinaya* then the polemic must be later than the monastic code but, for the borrowing to have had effect, probably not very much later. In this case if we can date the monastic code we can at least arrive at a date before which the polemic could not be dated. If code and polemic are roughly contemporaneous then dating the former would date the latter as well. Unfortunately, there is a good deal of confusion about the date of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* and the most commonly cited date is almost certainly wrong.

In his *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* published in 1958 Étienne Lamotte said in regard to the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*: “. . . one cannot attribute to this work a date earlier than the 4th–5th centuries of the Christian Era”,⁴⁶ and in spite of the fact that Lamotte’s own subsequent work rendered this assertion more and more untenable, and in spite of the fact that this assertion was – and remains – at odds with other scholarly views, still it is this date that is commonly cited.⁴⁷ Lamotte himself seems first to have encountered difficulties with his own date in an important paper entitled “Vajrapāṇi en Inde” published in 1966.⁴⁸ There he stumbled up against the fact – to summarize very briefly – that Vajrapāṇi was found frequently in Gandharan art starting from its earliest phases, phases that are securely, if only broadly, dated to the Kuṣāṇ period. But he was also forced to note that, apart from the *Buddhānusmṛtisamādhi-sūtra* which may well be a Central Asian or Chinese ‘apocryphal’ text of the early 5th century, the single most important, if not the only possible, textual source for Vajrapāṇi was the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. This was awkward and Lamotte – without ever explicitly jettisoning his earlier view – ends by saying that “la compilation” of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* “ne fut pas terminée avant le II^e siècle de notre ère” – this is a marked retreat from “one cannot

attribute to this work a date earlier than the 4th–5th centuries of the Christian Era”. Moreover Lamotte here goes on to say “grâce au *Vinaya* des *Mūlasarvāstivādin*, trois points seront acquis au I^{er} ou au II^e siècle de notre ère ...” which he then lists – the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* is now cited as evidencing developments in “the 1st or 2nd century of our era”.⁴⁹ But the complications did not end here.

Lamotte himself went on to make easily available even more evidence that undermined his own dating of the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya*. As he worked through his monumental translation of *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse* it became increasingly obvious that – as Demiéville noted already in his review of the second volume – “in matters of Vinaya, it [*Le traité*] follows the recension of the *Mūlasarvāstivādins*”; and in his ‘new’ introduction to the third volume Lamotte himself noted that in regard to both *Vinaya* and *Avadānas* the author of *Le traité* was “inspired” above all else by the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya*.⁵⁰ “It would be impossible”, Lamotte said, “to draw up here the list of more or less direct borrowings from the *Vinaya* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādins*” – they were far, far, too numerous.⁵¹

In itself, of course, the massive dependence of the author of *Le traité* on the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* was not a problem. The problem arose from the fact that in addition to ascertaining this dependence, Lamotte also went a long way towards showing that – in his words – “the author of the *Traité* certainly lived at the time of the Great Kuṣānas”.⁵² How an author who lived at the time of the Great Kuṣānas could depend so heavily on a work that cannot be dated earlier than the 4th/5th centuries was, of course, never explained. Gnoli has noted simply and succinctly: “the datation that Lamotte attributes to the *Vinaya* of the MSV in the *Traité* is apparently different from the one he proposes in HBI.”⁵³

Although, then, Lamotte himself never explicitly withdrew the date he purposed in 1958 for the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya*, his own material clearly forced him on more than one occasion back to the Kuṣān period for a date for the text. The Kuṣān period was, moreover, where almost everyone else had already put it, and the Kuṣān period is where it almost certainly belongs. R. Gnoli – who has already pointed out many of the problems with Lamotte’s dating of our monastic code – says: “however, one point seems certain to me: the date of the compilation of the *Vinaya* of the MSV is to be taken back to the times of Kaniṣka ...”;⁵⁴ and there is a great deal of diverse evidence that suggests that such a date cannot be very far off.⁵⁵

Obviously, if the date of the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* “is to be taken back to the times of Kaniṣka” or to the Kuṣān period, then – in light

of what has already been said above – so too must the polemics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra*. They cannot be taken to represent a late mahāyāna position, nor even a middle mahāyāna position, although some elements of their position are certainly found in what might be called middle mahāyāna *sūtras* like the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, the *Buddhabalādhānaprātihārya*, and even the *Suvarṇabhāsottama*.⁵⁶ That these polemics in fact date to a time when mahāyāna groups were first forming, or rather when mahāyāna literature was first being written, has already been suggested, perhaps, by internal evidence regarding their lack of a clear sense of group identity, for example. That they might date to a period near the beginning of the Common Era, or at least to a time before the Great Kuṣānas has already been suggested on the basis of lexical material that they share with the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. That such a date is fundamentally sound, however, is further confirmed, it seems, by an even more remarkable series of specific lexical links between our polemic and such diverse sources as a group of early Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions from the Northwest, the poet Aśvaghoṣa, and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*.

The author of the polemic on relics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* uses more than one expression that will appear to be familiar, for example, to anyone who has read even a little of the recent work done on early Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions. When, for example, the two monks Dharma and Sudharma are criticized by the gods and “those monks who were beginners” (*dge slong las dang po pa*) for not venerating the relics of the Tathāgata Puṣpavicitra,⁵⁷ the author of our polemic has them respond with the following rhetorical question: “What do you think friends? How does a Tathāgata come to be worshipped, and why do the relics of a Tathāgata, which are without life, receive worship? (*grogs po dag ‘di ji snyam du sems / ji ltar na de bzhin gshegs pa mchod par ‘gyur zhing / rgyu gang gis na de bzhin gshegs pa’i sku gdung sems pa mi mnga’ ba rnams kyis mchod pa brnyes par ‘gyur snyam /*).⁵⁸ The key expression here – and certainly the one most difficult to translate – is *sEMS pa mi mnga’ ba*, which I have glossed as “without life”. The final element here is perhaps the least difficult. *mnga’ ba* is the respectful form for *yod pa*, “to be”, and as an adjective generally means “being owned by”, “belonging to”, “having, owning”, and is frequently the equivalent of *dang ldan pa*, “to be possessed of”; here in the negative “not having”, “without”. *sEMS pa*, of course, normally means “to think”, but *sEMS* can mean “living or animated being”, and *sEMS pa can* – according to Roerich⁵⁹ – means “pregnant” – our *sEMS pa mi mnga’ ba* could be the exact respectful equivalent of the latter.

Although I have not found an attested Sanskrit equivalent for *sems pa mi mnga' ba*, *sems* can itself is an attested equivalent of *prāṇin*, literally “having or possessed of breath”, or “life”,⁶⁰ and *sems pa mi mnga' ba* could very easily be translated into Sanskrit as a negative form of *prāṇasameta*.

The significance of all this is, of course, that the relics of the Buddha are described in the so-called Shinkot or Bajaur Casket Inscription of the Time of Menander – perhaps the earliest actually dateable reference to such relics – as *prāṇa-sameda* = *prāṇasameta*, as “endowed with or possessed of breath or life”.⁶¹ Seen in this light the author of our polemic seems to be using either the same expression that was used by the individual who composed the Shinkot or Bajaur inscription, or an expression that was very similar to it, an expression that was already current in the 1st or 2nd century B.C.E. outside of texts. But in using that expression the author of our polemic was also reacting against – in fact denying – its validity. Since he negates the expression he is quietly denying what must have been in his day an old but still current conception of the relics of the Buddha. Or so at least it seems, and there is much less uncertainty about another of his expressions.

The author of our polemic on relics also uses – on two separate occasions – another expression that can be traced even more clearly in Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions. In response to the rhetorical question of the monks Dharma and Sudharma just quoted the author of our polemic has “the monks and gods” – who represent, of course, the point-of-view in need of correction – say: “Because these relics are imbued with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release, they are therefore worthy of worship” (*sku gdung 'di dag ni tshul khrims dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong bas rab tu phye ba yin pas na / de'i phyir 'di dag ni mchod par 'os pa yin no*).⁶² That this is indeed the point-of-view in need of correction is then confirmed by Dharma's and Sudharma's counter-response: “But, friends, these relics are then surely worthy of worship because good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release are themselves worthy of worship?” (*grogs po dag 'o na tshul khrims dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba dag nyid mchod pa'i 'os yin gyi / sku gdung dag ni mchod par 'os par mi 'gyur ba ma yin nam*). The author of our polemic here seems to treat the assertion that relics are “imbued” with good conduct, etc., very much like he had treated the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk – he denies

neither but wants to go beyond both. And if in the first instance he was aiming at a current or contemporary conception, it is very likely that he was doing the same thing in the second.

Our polemist also does not deny that relics are imbued with good conduct, etc., when he repeats the assertion a second time – he simply turns it against those he does not approve of:

Although they themselves are defective in good conduct, unfocused, defective in wisdom, not released, and without the knowledge and vision of release still, solely for the sake of making a living, they intend to honor and venerate and worship the relics of the Tathāgata which are pervaded with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release. (*de dag ni bdag nyid tshul khrims 'chal pa dang / brjed ngas pa dang / shes rab 'chal pa dang / nram par ma grol ba dang / nram par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba ma yin bzhin du 'tsho ba tsam gyi phyir / de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung tshul khrims dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / nram par grol ba dang / nram par grol ba'i ye shes mthong bas yongs su bsgos pa dag la bkur sti bya ba dang / ri mor bya ba dang / mchod par bya bar sems so l*).⁶³

Aside from some interesting rhetorical moves, what needs to be noted here is that – as with the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk and the formula describing the abandonment of monastic activities – it is very unlikely that the author of the polemic on relics in the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda* invented the language that he is using. In fact, virtually the same exact characterization of the relics of the Buddha occurs in “the Inscription of Senavarma, King of Oḍi” where we find: *ima dhadu śīla(pari)bhavita samasiprañavimutiñāṇadra(śa)paribhavita*, which Salomon translates as “these relics . . . saturated with virtue, saturated with concentration, wisdom, release, knowledge and sight”.⁶⁴ And something very like it also occurs in another early Kharoṣṭhī inscription: *te dhadu ve śīla-paribhāvīda sama(s)i-paribhaveṃtu prañā-paribhāvīda*, which Fussman renders as “ces reliques . . . parfumées de moralité, parfumées de concentration, parfumées de discernement”.⁶⁵ The parallels – if that is what we should call them – could scarcely be more exact. But the idea that the relics of the Buddha were “imbued” or “saturated” or “parfumées” with the very qualities that defined the living Buddha, and the use of the term *paribhāvita* to express it, were at one time widespread in the Indian Buddhist world. They also occur, as I have noticed elsewhere, in Aśvaghōṣa’s *Buddhacarita*: relics, Aśvaghōṣa says, are “full of virtue” (*dge legs gang ba*) and “informed (*paribhāvita*) with universal benevolence (*maitrī*)” – *byams pas yongs su nram par bsgoms pa*. They also occur in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* where relics are said, for example, to be “saturated with the Perfection of Wisdom” (*prajñāpāramitāparibhāvita*).⁶⁶

We have, then, a group of very different kinds of sources – inscriptions, learned *kāvya*, mahāyāna *sūtra* – in which the same basic idea is expressed using the same key and characteristic verbal expression. Here of course the idea of ‘borrowing’ seems even less appropriate than it did in the cases of the assertion of the twofold occupation and the formula for the abandonment of monastic activities, and there is good evidence in support of quite another explanation: these inscriptions, the learned *kāvya*, and the mahāyāna *sūtra* all express the same basic idea with the same basic vocabulary not because one borrowed from another, but because they all date to the same period, and because both idea and expression were current at the time. Both inscriptions can be dated with some precision to the first half of the 1st century A.D.;⁶⁷ Johnston dates Aśvaghoṣa to “between 50 B.C. and 100 A.D. with a preference for the first half of the 1st century A.D.”;⁶⁸ the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* too is commonly assigned to the same century.⁶⁹ That the author of the polemics in the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda* shares with all three both basic idea and specific verbal expression would also strongly suggest that he must share the same dates as well, that all four sources are in fact contemporary. The further fact that the inscriptions and Aśvaghoṣa simply assert that relics are “imbued” with good conduct, etc., but both the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the polemic in the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda* want in addition to blunt in some sense the received significance of such an assertion and redirect the focus away from relics may suggest – if anything – that these two mahāyāna sources might be somewhat later. But that they are much later seems very unlikely, and in any case we once again end up at the Kuṣāṇ period.

In addition to the chronological anchor that these parallels may provide, however, they may help as well to place our polemic geographically. The expression *ima dhadu śīla(pari)bhavita samasipraṇa[vimuti]vimutiñāṇadra(śa)paribhavita* which occurs in the inscription of Senavarma and for which there is an almost exact parallel in our polemic is, epigraphically speaking, uniquely and characteristically a North-West Indian idiom. Neither it, nor the use of *paribhāvita* in regard to relics, occurs anywhere else in Indian inscriptions.⁷⁰ In spite of the fact that several colophons describe Aśvaghoṣa as a *sāketaka*, “a native of Sāketa”,⁷¹ there is a strong and persistent tradition – ferreted out largely by Sylvain Lévi – which associates Aśvaghoṣa with Kaniṣka and the Kuṣāṇa empire.⁷² Indeed, in spite of Johnston’s remarks against such an association, Renou, for example, was able to say without comment that Aśvaghoṣa “fut un contemporain et un protégé de roi Kanishka (donc, prob. du II^es) . . .”,⁷³ and at least one of Johnston’s arguments

against the association would now have to be further evaluated. He said, for example: “moreover the internal evidence of the extant works makes it somewhat doubtful whether they could have been written in the Kushan kingdom. For while Brahmanical literature represents that dynasty as hostile to the Brahmins, Aśvaghōṣa writes for a circle in which Brahmanical learning and ideas are supreme . . .”⁷⁴ But – allowing for the amorphous character of the term ‘brahmanical’ – virtually the same thing could be said about the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. It is saturated with references to “brahmanical learning and ideas” and practices, and full of indications of an accommodation to them,⁷⁵ and yet probably no one doubts that it too was compiled in the North-West, and most would place that compilation in the Kuṣāna period. It is, moreover, becoming increasingly clear from art historical, inscriptional, and numismatic sources that the Kuṣāna kingdom was religiously diverse and had a significant ‘Hindu’ or ‘Brahmanical’ component.⁷⁶ All of this is to say that even if we still cannot place the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* geographically,⁷⁷ still the preponderance of the ‘evidence’, the linkages and parallels all point, it seems, towards placing the composition of our polemic in Northwest India at the time of the great Kuṣānas, or a little before. It is as well worth noting that however unsatisfactory our evidence here is it is far, far better than what we usually have for other pieces of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature.

* * *

If the polemic on relics in the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda* can in fact be better located and more closely dated than is usually the case with other pieces of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature, and if in fact it represents a demonstrably early mahāyāna position in regard to relics, then it is of more than causal interest, in part at least because of the importance still assigned by some to the worship of *stūpas* in “the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism”. Something of the position of the author of this polemic has already emerged, no doubt, in the attempt to date it. Still more needs to be made explicit. But some aspects of that position are so strongly drawn and so often repeated that they lend themselves to summarization.

If anything like a lay movement was ever a part of early mahāyāna groups our author gives no evidence of it, and it is probably safe to say that had there been he at least would almost certainly not have approved of it. His text is in every possible sense a monastic text: it is directed at monks; it is concerned with monastic behavior; it repeatedly praises becoming a monk, repeatedly points out that monks gain superior merit; and it was almost certainly written by a monk, a monk who gets so

carried away with his own enthusiasm that he creates an imagined past period in which everyone – literally everyone – enters the religious life: *od srungs de nas gling chen po bzhi pa'i jig rten gyi kham de na sems can gcig kyang khyim na gnas par ma gyur te*, “at that time, Kāśyapa, in that world of four continents there was not a single person who lived in a house”.⁷⁸

But the monastic ideal of our author is also a very narrow and severe one. Although he knows of monasteries, his monasticism is firmly and self-righteously located in the forest. This orientation is particularly pronounced in the ‘story of the past’ which prefaces and prefigures the more discursive portion of the polemic on relics. Upon entering the religious life the two monks who are the heroes of that ‘story of the past’ deliver a long series of verses whose point is difficult to miss.

Even those past most excellent Lords of the
World on that account did not obtain the
most excellent awakening when they had
made their residence in a household.

Those past Buddhas, Lords of the World,
who experienced *nirvāṇa* – all of them
obtained the most excellent awakening in
the forest, in the wilderness.

*'jig rten mgon po bla na med
snga ma 'ga' yang gang gi phyir
khyim gyi gnas na gnas mdzad nas
bla med byang chub brnyes pa med //*
*sngon gyi sangs rgyas 'jig rten mgon
gang su mya ngan 'das gyur pa
kun gyis dgon par rab dgon du
bla med byang chub brynes par gyur //*⁷⁹

To verses like these – distinct echoes of which are found in other examples of what might be called forest oriented mahāyāna *sūtras* like the *Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā*⁸⁰ – can be added others like:

Those who have quickly rejected the house
and taken up residence in the forest,
they – wise and seeing correctly –
train in conformity with the Buddhas.

Those who make efforts for the sake
of awakening, they keep themselves in
solitude, they rejoice in the forest, they
find no joy in the house.⁸¹

Even those – perhaps especially those – who are committed to helping others remain, or should remain, aloof and isolated in the forest:

Those who want to free those persons who are
tormented by passions, etc., are terrified by

living in a house and keep themselves entirely to the forest.⁸²

This ideal – which is still being repeated as late as Śāntideva's *Aranyasamvarṇana*⁸³ – is decidedly not a lay ideal. But neither is it the ideal found in mainstream *vinayas* where monks who frequent the forest are almost always objects of ambivalence or amusement, and presented as particularly prone to sexual problems. In fact there are clear instances where monks are explicitly forbidden to go to the forest.⁸⁴ The 'good' monk in the various *vinayas* is, rather, a fully integrated member of a well organized community with a plethora of social and institutional obligations and duties. He is clean, well attired, and respectable. Some sense of the ambivalence directed towards forest dwellers in these monastic codes, and at least a subliminal hint that those who redacted them did not always even want to recognize that such individuals might belong to *their* community, seems to lurk in a story in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* that was also excerpted in the *Divyāvadāna*. Here Kāśyapa – the same Kāśyapa who is the main interlocutor in our polemic – shows up at the door of Anāthapiṇḍada's house to partake of a meal offered to the community. But because Anāthapiṇḍada's doorman had been told not to admit any non-buddhist religious, and because Kāśyapa's hair and beard were long and his robe in a bad state from living in the forest (*mahākāśyapo 'nyatamasmād āraṇyakāc chayanāsanād dīrghakeśaśmaśrulūhacīvaro*), he was summarily turned away – he was not recognized as a Buddhist monk.⁸⁵

In its promotion of this forest-ideal our polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* is, however, not unique. It is rather only a specific instance of what appears to have been a concerted effort in a significant number of mahāyāna *sūtras* to revive, revitalize, or reinvent the 'old' forest ideal. What may be unique about our polemic is that it is one of the very few such efforts that might actually be dateable, and if in fact it dates to the Kuṣāṇ period that would place the beginnings of these attempted revitalizations at the beginning of mahāyāna literatures. That such efforts to revive the forest ideal would start at this particular time would, moreover, probably not be fortuitous: this was also almost certainly the period during which Buddhist monasticism – especially in the North – was being fully housed in permanent, well organized, elaborately constructed monasteries, monasteries that would have required permanent staffs, well organized divisions of labor, and elaborate financial infrastructures.⁸⁶ Some monks – like the author of our polemic – may not have liked the changes and may have reacted to

it with a call – real or rhetorical or both – to return to the ‘old’ ways. Some mahāyāna forest texts in fact even resurrect what are almost certainly the old verbal formulae or slogans of the forest ideal: both the *Rāṣṭrapāla* and the *Samādhirāja*, for example, repeat the exhortation to live alone like the rhinoceros or its horn.⁸⁷

Such calls to return to the forest – a dominant theme in both polemics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* – must suggest that this call was an important component of at least a part of that convoluted tangle of movements that we still try to contain by the designation ‘the early mahāyāna’. But this component must also mark these movements not as progressive, but as remarkably conservative, if not actually reactionary. And although this conservative character of significant strands of ‘the early mahāyāna’ has often been overlooked, it is everywhere apparent in our polemic.

The dominance of the call to return to the forest in our polemic must not, however, be taken to imply that our author had nothing to say about the place of laymen in his scheme of things. He does speak of both it and them, but what he has to say in this regard is, again, remarkably conservative. He clearly seems to have thought that what laymen do in giving, for example, was infinitely inferior to what bodhisattvas who remain apart and live in forests and the wilderness do, even if that is to only obtain for the length of a finger snap “patience in regard to the fact that all things are not produced”.⁸⁸ This is at least the substance of a large part of the story of the past presented in our polemic where the merit of such a forest-dweller is said to be far, far greater than all the merit a king generates through elaborate gifts to the community of food, clothing, and monasteries, etc., even though that king puts aside all other lay duties and does nothing else but make such gifts for eighty four thousand years (*rgyal po mu khyud des . . . lo brgyad khri bzhi stong rdzogs kyi bar du las gzhan mi byed par khyim gyi yid la byed pa thams cad spangs te . . .*).⁸⁹ This is not of course a ringing recommendation of either lay activity or the religious potential of lay life, nor is the narrative fact, already noted, that all laymen – literally all – end by entering the religious life in this same story. When, in other words, our author imagines an ideal world of long ago it is ultimately a world in which there are only monks.⁹⁰ The story of the past is, however, not the only place in our polemic where reference is made to laymen.

Outside of the story of the past there are at least two other important passages that make reference to laymen, one at the beginning and one at the end of the main body of the tract – the topic in fact quite literally frames the entire debate. These two passages make it particularly clear

that although the ‘dialectical’ language of our author sometimes may appear to be both advanced and progressive, his position in regard to laymen and in regard to relics and their worship, most certainly is not. And here we come very near to the heart of the matter.

We might begin at the end, with the second of these two passages, a part of which we have already seen. The passage starts by saying: “at a future time some monks who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas and adherents of the Vehicle of the Disciples will appear who do not develop the body, do not develop thought, etc.” – the text, then, starts with ‘bad’ monks, so bad – as we will see – that they are not even as good as laymen. Then:

Kāśyapa, although I have empowered (*byin gyis rlob par mdzad de, adhiṣṭhita*) relics for the purpose of rendering devout the minds of sons and daughters of good family who are neophytes (*rigs kyi bu dang rigs kyi bu mo las dang po pa dag gi sems mngon par dang par bya ba'i phyir*), and although those who would worship them will experience the good fortune of gods and men, and although that might be an intermediate cause for their *nirvāṇa*,⁹¹ still there are dullards who, when they have entered into the religious life in this Order, abandon and reject the (true) occupation of a religious which I have declared, and, for the sake of sustaining themselves, for the sake of cultivating the houses of friends and houses that give alms, for the sake of acquiring robes and bowls ... provide honor to the relics and *stūpas* of the Tathāgata.

... These dullards reject such occupations of a religious and search out other occupations. They do not even train in the training which I have taught for white-robed householders, even though white-robed householders obtain the fruit of never returning by training for only a short time in the trainings as they were delivered by the Tathāgata (*de dag ni ngas khyim na gnas pa gos dkar po can rnam kyi bslab par gsungs pa gang yin pa de tsam la 'ang slob par mi byed do / khyim na gnas pa gos dkar po can rnam kyang re zhig de bzhin gshegs pas bslab pa ji ltar bcas pa rnam la slob par byed pa na / phyir mi 'ong ba'i 'bras bu 'thob par gyur na*). When, after they have already entered the religious life in this Order, these dullards do not develop even so much as this which conforms to release how could they obtain it? – that cannot be (*mi blun po de dag ni bstan pa 'di la rab tu byung nas rnam par grol ba dang / rjes su mthun pa tsam yang sgom par mi byed na / 'thob par lta ga la 'gyur te / de ni gnas med do /*).⁹²

The view of lay practice and lay religious potential that is implied here is, of course, not unique to our polemic. In fact something very like it is not infrequently found in a wide range of sources that have no discernable connection with anything specifically mahāyāna, and therein, perhaps, lies its interest: the author of our polemic here again seems to be taking a position which is probably more often taken to represent that of the conservative mainstream monk. He seems to think, for example, that relics are for neophytes. He, like a number of conservative monks after him, seems to have considered laymen largely incapable of anything other than devotion and external pious acts. Although he seems to allow that what they do might have some

connection with an ultimate religious achievement, he also seems to think that the most that might be expected from such activities is the achievement of worldly – divine or human – success. But his views of laymen are even more apparent in what he says about religious who do what laymen do: they are stupid; they have given up real religious practice; and they are only interested in material gain. These appear to be strong views and so out of keeping with what might have been expected from an early mahāyāna text that there might well be a suspicion that such an interpretation can only be the result of misreading the text. Any such suspicion, however, will be hard to maintain in the face of the second passage in our polemic which makes explicit reference to laymen, a passage which – not incidentally – may well also reveal one of the primary sources of our author's view.

It is fairly certain – as we will see – that later authors who developed or maintained views similar to those we seem to see in our polemic drew directly or support, or inspiration, on a particular reading of certain passages from various versions of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. Our author may, indeed, have done the same, and may have been one of the earliest to have done so. At least so it seems from our second passage where the Buddha is made to say:

Kāśyapa, in the last time, in the last period, in the final five hundred years, those bodhisattvas who have been taken hold of by bad friends and are destitute of determination will make efforts in acts of worship by presenting flowers, incense, aromatic powders, perfume, garlands, unguents, umbrellas, banners, flags, chimes and lamps to the relics of the Tathāgata. Although, Kāśyapa, worship was taught by me (only) so that those deprived of wisdom could accumulate roots of good, still these dullards make efforts in it ('od srungs ngas ni shes pa dang mi ldan pa rnams kyi [rd: kyi]⁹³ dge ba'i rtsa ba yang dag par bsgrub pa'i phyir mchod pa bshad pa yin na l mi blun po de dag ni de la brtson par 'gyur te⁹⁴

Then follows immediately a passage already quoted, but worth repeating for what it tells us about our author's sources:

I, Kāśyapa, in the presence of the world with its gods, have said: "You, monks, must continue with efforts that are applied to disciplining yourselves and calming. Since there are brahmins and householders who are devout, they will perform the worship of relics for my relics!" But in spite of this, look, Kāśyapa, how these dullards, when they have even given up *yoga*, even given up religious exertion . . . will make efforts in acts of worship of relics and, supporting themselves on those, intend only to make a living!⁹⁵

Although in part the terminology differs here, this passage is little more than a rephrasing of the passage cited just before it. Here again the objects of our author's criticism are monks who do what laymen do. Although he does not explicitly say so here, the "bodhisattvas" our author has in mind, "those bodhisattvas who have been taken hold

of by bad friends and are destitute of determination”, were obviously monks: they are both criticized for doing what laymen are supposed to do and described as being derelict in the duties of a monk, neither of which would be grounds for criticism if they were laymen. Such monks or religious are also once again described as “stupid”, and this happens twice here, and once again the activities of laymen are presented as inferior: they are for those who lack wisdom and are intended only for the accumulation of the roots of merit. Once again too laymen appear as largely incapable of anything other than pious external acts – at least that is all that is assigned to them here. But here the author of our polemic also actually cites what must have been a primary and important source for his views.

Although the quotation that our author has the Buddha cite does not correspond exactly to any extant version of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, it almost certainly comes from one, it almost certainly constitutes a version or paraphrase of what the Buddha was supposed to have said to Ānanda when Ānanda had asked him how one should proceed in regard to the Buddha’s *body* after his death. There are in fact several versions of this ‘saying’ extant in Indian languages. The Sanskrit text reconstructed by Waldschmidt⁹⁶ has:

alpotsukas tvam ānanda bhava śārīrapūjāyāḥ / prasannā brāhmaṇagr̥hapataya etad āpādayiṣyanti – “You, Ānanda, must have few concerns in regard to the honors for the body! Devout brahmins and householders will take care of that.”

The version quoted in the *Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa*⁹⁷ says:

alpotsukair yuṣmābhir bhavitavyam. upāsakāḥ śārīraṃ yathā jñāsyanti tathā kariṣyanti – “vous devez avoir peu de désirs; quant aux laïcs, ils traiteront mon corps comme ils (sauront)”; or perhaps a bit more accurately: “you all must have few concerns. As lay brothers understand so will they do in regard to the body.”

And the Pāli version in the *Dīgha-nikāya*:⁹⁸

avyāvaṭṭa tumhe ānanda hotha tathāgatassa sarīra-pujāya, iṅgha tumhe ānanda sadatthe ghaṭṭatha, sadattham anuyuñjatha, sadatthe appamattā ātāpino pahitattā viharatha. sant’ ānanda khattiya-paṇḍitā pi brāhmaṇa-paṇḍitā pi gahapati-paṇḍitā pi tathāgate abhippasannā, te tathāgatassa sarīra-pūjaṃ karissanti

You all, Ānanda, must not worry in regard to the honors for the body of the Tathāgata! Look here, Ānanda, you all must be engaged in the highest goal, you must attend to the highest goal, you must continue heedful, ardent, and intent on the highest goal! There are, Ānanda, wise kṣatriyas, wise brahmins and wise householders who are devout in regard to the Tathāgata; they will perform the honors for the body of the Tathāgata.

When seen in the light of these various versions it is hard to see how the text cited in our polemic could be anything other than yet another version of this ‘same’ exhortation:

*dge slong dag khyed cag ni bdag nyid dul ba dang zhi bar sbyor ba'i rjes su brston
pas gnas par gyis shig l bram ze dang khyim bdag dad pa dang ldan pa dag yod
na de dag ni nga'i sku gdung rnams la sku gdung gi mchod pa byed par 'gyur ro l*

The text in our polemic does not – as already noted – correspond exactly to any of the other versions, but none of the other versions corresponds to one another either. This clearly was a contested saying, the most elaborate and ideologically saturated version being found in Pāli. But the version cited by the author of our polemic does differ in at least one important regard: in the two Sanskrit versions and in the Pāli version the activity under discussion quite clearly has to do with the *body* of the Buddha, not his relics, and this almost certainly was the original topic of discussion.⁹⁹ Something has clearly happened between these versions and the version of the exhortation in our polemic, and in this instance we may actually be able to say what that was because the same thing may very well have happened independently – and later – elsewhere.

It is virtually certain that the Sanskrit underlying the Tibetan phrase *sku gdung rnams la sku gdung gi mchod pa* that occurs in our polemic was *śarīre śarīra-pūjā*, a phrase which occurs dozens of times in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, and related texts like the *Avadānaśataka*, in purely funereal contexts where it can only mean: “honors for the body on the body” – the same phrase, in the same meaning, occurs twice in Waldschmidt’s *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. But in spite of this the Tibetan translators of the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda* rendered the phrase into Tibetan here as *sku gdung rnams la sku gdung gi mchod pa*,¹⁰⁰ which just as certainly can only mean “worship for the relics on the relics”, and, although this is almost certainly not a literal translation, it is very likely that it correctly reflects our author’s intention and that the translators knew this.

Elsewhere, of course, and here too, the shift of meaning from “body” to “relics” is effected or signaled by a shift in grammatical number. In Sanskrit *śarīra* in the singular means “body”, but in the plural “relics”.¹⁰¹ It is, however, not necessary to assume that the author of our polemic actually wrote *śarīreṣu* in his original – such a major change in a set phrase is very unlikely. It is far more likely either that he himself was trying to force a change, or was reflecting a change that was already occurring, in the interpretation of the phrase and the significance attributed to the exhortation; in short, that he was making much the same exegetical move that the compilers of the late books of the *Milindapañha* would come to make. There too *śarīra-pūjā* at least is being presented as now referring to the relics of the Buddha, not his

body, and the exhortation is there being interpreted in such a way that it appears to support the assertion that worshipping relics, indeed worship in general, “is not the occupation of the sons of the Jina” (*akammaṃ h’etaṃ mahārāja jinaputtānaṃ yad idaṃ pūjā*). Worship, the compilers of the *Milindapañha* will also determine, is for the *śleṣas*, both human and divine (*avasesānaṃ devamanussānaṃ pūjā karaṇīyā*).¹⁰²

It is of course just conceivable that all these suggestions might not win universal assent and that some might require modification. But however the details might eventually be determined, some things here seem to be secure and settled. It seems fairly certain, for example, that once again the author of this early mahāyāna polemic was drawing heavily on important mainstream sources – and we may in fact be able to detect even further influences of his specific source. It seems fairly certain too that our author’s views on laymen – on their practices and religious potential – were hardly radical. They seem to have come straight out of a very narrow and conservative reading of a primary mainstream source. This is not what one might expect to find at the beginning of what was supposed to be a major revolution which was supposed to have radically redefined religious roles. It is, however, what is actually found in what appears to be a demonstrably early ‘mahāyāna’ tract.

* * *

What remains here – and that seems only fitting – are the relics. And since we have in passing already seen much of what our author had to say about both relics and the worship of relics we can, perhaps, be uncharacteristically brief and simply summarize.

On one level our author seems to have been ambivalent in regard to relics. He denies that they had life or were alive – if that is what *sems pa mi mnga’ ba* means – and yet has the Buddha himself say that he “empowered” them. *Adhitiṣṭhati* is, of course, in all its forms notoriously difficult to translate, but in contexts like ours it must come very close to “enliven, invigorate, or make endure”; or “to sustain”, “make continue”; or something very like that.¹⁰³

At first glance our author seems to accept the assertion that the relics of the Buddha are “imbued with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, etc.”, which seems to have been widely accepted in his day. But, first of all, he has the gods and neophyte monks introduce the idea and thereby immediately distances himself from it – these two groups never speak for him. Then he subjects the assertion to two tight exegetical twists. His gods and neophyte monks make the assertion to justify the worship of

those relics: those relics are worshipped *because* they are imbued with good conduct and concentration. But our author's heroes, the Monks Dharma and Sudharma, then draw an all but unavoidable conclusion: if that is so, if those relics are worshipped because they are imbued with these qualities, then it is really the qualities themselves that are worthy of worship.¹⁰⁴ This is the first exegetical twist. The second comes a little later and is equally obvious: "...and those qualities through the possession of which the relics of the Tathāgata have received worship – those qualities themselves must be perfected. Just so would the Tathāgata be worshipped" (... *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung yon tan gang dag dang ldan pas mchod pa brnyes par gyur ba'i yon tan de dag bdag nyid kyis bsgrub par bya ste l de ltar na de bzhin gshegs pa mchod par 'gyur ro*).¹⁰⁵ The handling here is nothing if not skilled.

Our author, however, does not completely reject conventional worship. It was taught by the Buddha. It can produce or result in the experience of both divine and human good fortune, the accumulation of roots of merit, even the state of 'never returning'. But it is also only for those who lack wisdom, for devout brahmins and householders, certainly not – according to our author – for monks or religious, at least 'good' monks or religious, monks or religious who have not given up their 'proper' occupation. Our author, however, perhaps inadvertently, himself indicates that there were other views on the matter, views which he felt compelled to respond to. Our author apparently knew – or at least anticipated – that monks who did not engage in the *stūpa* cult would be subject to criticism and accused of impiety. The whole purpose of his polemic is in some ways to deflect such criticism and deflate such charges. He says as much by how he introduces the discussion. The Monks Dharma and Sudharma who deliver the bulk of the argument do not do so as a gratuitous service to their fellows, but in direct response to a specific criticism of their own behavior that is made in part by other monks. Dharma and Sudharma – names certainly not casually chosen – say what they say in direct response to what was said about them:

Kāśyapa, the two Monks Dharma and Sudharma had few occupations then and, persisting in efforts connected with their own good, they did not even worship the relics of that Blessed One, did not venerate them, and did not even go to that Tathāgata's *stūpa*. Because of that, Kāśyapa, those many hundreds of thousands of gods and those monks who were neophytes were critical of the Monks Dharma and Sudharma saying "these two do not even worship the relics of the Tathāgata! They do not even circumambulate the *stūpa* of the Tathāgata! They consequently are impious and undevout." ('*od srungs de na dge slong chos dang chos bzang gnyis bya ba nyung ba dang l bdag gi don la sbyor ba'i rjes su brston par gnas shing l bcom ldan 'das de'i sku gdung nmams la 'ang mchod pa mi byed l ri mor mi byed la l*

*de bzhin gshegs pa de'i mchod rten gyi drung du 'ang mi 'gro 'o / 'od srungs de nas lha 'bum phrag rab tu mang po dang dge slong las dang po pa gang dag yin pa de dag dge slong chos dang chos bzang gnyis la / 'di gnyis ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung rnams la mchod pa 'ang mi byed / de bzhin gshegs pa'i mchod rten bskor ba 'ang mi byed pa las na / ma dad pa dang ma gus pa yin no zhes kha zer bar gyur to /)*¹⁰⁶

As might have been expected, and as this passage makes clear, our author is not just developing a polemic against what some monks do. He is also – and perhaps more importantly – defending other monks who are open to criticism for what they do not do. The expectation in his day seems to have been that monks do and should venerate relics and *stūpas*, that if they don't they will be subject to social, even divine, criticism. The latter at least seems to have been our author's expectation, and the former was certainly the expectation of all continental mainstream *Vinayas* – even the Pāli *Vinaya*, it now seems sure, has rules governing monastic behavior connected with *stūpas*.¹⁰⁷ When our author presents arguments to justify monks *not* engaging in the relic cult he is then – or so it seems – defending an innovation that he approves of and wants to further: this is the position in need of justification. So if there is something 'new' in this early mahāyāna polemic it is, in other words, that monks – our author also calls them *bodhisattvas* – should not engage in such cult activity. Here, it seems, is the opposite of what might have been expected.

In the course of his argument our author also gives at least three different reasons why monks should not engage in the relic cult. The first can be expressed in two slightly different ways; he suspects the motives of monks who engage in the relic cult; or *he* thinks monks who engage in the relic cult do so only to make a living or for material gain. He says, for example as we have seen, that some monks – he calls them “stupid” – engage in the relic cult “for the sake of sustaining themselves, for the sake of cultivating the houses of friends and houses that give alms, for the sake of acquiring bowls and robes . . . acquisitions and honors . . . renown, reputation and fame.” But such monks must have been really stupid if this in fact were not possible, if in fact a monk could not gain material support and reputation from engaging in the relic cult. If it was not already an established practice for “houses that give alms” to give their alms to monks who worship *stūpas*, then why would a monk who wanted alms engage in such practices? In other words, for our author's claim or 'prediction' to be credible, his audience must already have been familiar with – or at least able to imagine – a situation in which material support, honors, renown, and reputation went to monks who did indeed participate in the worship

of relics and *stūpas*, a situation in which monastic status was at least in part determined by such activity. If this was not the situation our author faced and was trying to reform then he was flaying at the wind.

The author of our polemic also insists that monks who engage in the relic cult are not engaging in the proper occupations of a monk. He insists, at least initially, that the proper occupations of a monk are meditation and recitation. But in doing so he is – as we have seen – doing nothing more than insisting that what is repeatedly stated in a mainstream monastic code, should be adhered to. This would be a curious kind of innovation, and is rather characteristic of deeply conservative movements. In fact the author of our polemic seems to be insisting on a far stricter and far more narrow interpretation of the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk than the redactors of the code that repeats it held. Those redactors, in addition to repeating the assertion, framed rules requiring, for example, that monks attend rituals connected with the establishment of *stūpas* and presentations to them, and that attendance was compulsory; rules that required monks to venerate *stūpas* at the conclusion of monastic funerals, to anoint and sprinkle *stūpas* with scents, use perfumes to daub palm prints on *stūpas*, sweep, clean, and help build them, put pavements down around the *stūpas* so that when they venerate them they will not get their feet muddy; rules that require monks to use property belonging to the Buddha to maintain *stūpas* and forbidding monks to transfer donations made to a *stūpa* to some other purpose; rules requiring that permanent endowments be accepted and lent out on interest to, again, maintain *stūpas* and pay for the costs involved in their worship; rules allowing monks to step on the shadow cast by the pole of a *stūpa* if they first recite a verse of scripture, and not allowing monks who have eaten garlic or are wearing robes made from cemetery-cloth to approach the *stūpa*.¹⁰⁸

Although already long, this list however only represents a sample of such rules, rules that make it clear that for the redactors of this *Vinaya* the *stūpa* was an integral and pervasive part of what they thought the life of a monk should be. They, in other words and unlike our author, could not have understood their own assertion literally; they could not have seen in that same assertion any suggestion that *stūpa* worship was not a part of what a monk should do. Such an interpretation was, if anything was, an innovation of our author, so that once again where we might expect to find in an early ‘mahāyāna’ source a broadening and inclusive approach, what we actually find is a narrow literalist one. We find an odd situation in which a ‘mahāyāna’ author insists on a

far more conservative reading of a monastic trope than a mainstream *Vinaya* did.

The third and final reason that our author gives for insisting that monks should not participate in the relic cult can perhaps be easily, if crudely, paraphrased: the real worship of the Buddha is not accomplished through external pious acts but by internal religious achievement. He says as much – as we have seen – when he says: “. . . and those qualities through the possession of which the relics of the Tathāgata have received worship – those qualities themselves must be perfected. Just so would the Tathāgata be [truly] worshipped”.¹⁰⁹ But once again neither the language nor the notion that appear here are unique to our author or particularly mahāyāna. Since what I have translated as “perfected” here is in Tibetan *bsgrub par bya ba*, and since forms of *sgrub pa* are widely attested equivalents of *pratipatti*, *pratipad*, etc., our author, it seems, is simply insisting on the superiority of *pratipatti*, “practice”, over *pūjā*, “worship”, a position he would then share with a wide variety of mainstream sources.

This same position, for example, is already (?) articulated in the Pāli *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* in a very odd passage where it seems the world of nature itself is criticized for showing its devotion to the dying Buddha. When the Buddha is lying between the twin *sāla* trees they burst into flower out of season and these flowers drop “out of reverence” for the Tathāgata (*tathāgatassa pūjāya*) on the body (*sarīra*) of the Buddha; then heavenly flowers and sandalwood powder fall from the sky, and heavenly music and song resound from the sky, all, again, *tathāgatassa pūjāya*. But the Buddha’s reaction to this remarkable display is equally remarkable. He says:

*na kho ānanda ettavatā tathāgato sakkato vā hoti garukato vā mānito vā pūjito vā apacito vā. yo kho ānanda bhikkhu vā bhikkhunī vā upāsako vā upāsikā vā dhammānudhamma-paṭipanno viharati samīci-paṭipanno anudhamma-cārī, so tathāgataṃ sakkaroti garukaroti māneti pūjēti paramāya pūjāya.*¹¹⁰

Not indeed, Ānanda, by even this much is the Tathāgata honored or revered or respected or worshipped or venerated. But, Ānanda, the monk or nun or lay brother or lay sister who continues practicing in accordance with the Dharma, practicing rightly, proceeding in the proper way, he honors, reveres, respects, worships, the Tathāgata with the most excellent worship.

The Sanskrit text of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* reconstructed by Waldschmidt seems not to have anything corresponding to this curious account, but other Sanskrit versions must have had something like it.¹¹¹ Speyer already long ago pointed out that an otherwise lost “Northern” version of “the words spoken by the Lord at the time of his Complete Extinction” was quoted in one of the fascinating “epilogues” added to

the chapters of Āryasūra's *Jātakamālā*, epilogues added, he thinks, by monks to help other monks prepare for preaching.¹¹² The 'quotation' found at the end of Āryasūra's chapter XXX comes in the following form:

*Yaccoktaṃ bhagavatā parinirvāṇasamaye samupasthiteṣu divyakusumavāditrādiṣu na khalu punar ānandaitāvataḥ tathāgataḥ satkṛto bhavatīti / tac caivaṃ nidarśayitavyam / evaṃ abhiprāyasampādanāt pūjā kṛtā bhavati na gandhamālyādyabhihāreṇeti //*¹¹³

And what was said by the Blessed One at the time of his final nirvāṇa when heavenly flowers and music, etc., had appeared: 'not, indeed, Ānanda, by even this much is the Tathāgata honored' – just that should be expounded (with the words of this story:) 'from fulfilling ones intentions thus worship and honor are done, not by bringing flowers, garlands, etc.

The appropriateness of these instructions are clear from a glance at the *Jātaka* they are attached to. Āryasūra's *Hastijātaka* is in fact little more than a zoomorphic allegorization of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* passage. In it a magnificent elephant meets a band of starving exiles. He realizes they will perish if he does not sacrifice his body for them. He tells them to go to a certain place where they will find the body of an elephant, and he tells them to "use its flesh as provisions and its entrails as water bags to collect water". Then the elephant rushes ahead of them to the place, and throws himself from a mountain there. When the exiles find the body and recognize it some of them are so moved that they say "we ought rather to pay our debt to him by cremating his body with full honors" – the absurdity of this reaction is left devastatingly unstated. Śūra simply has others of the group say, in Khoroché's translation, "by doing this we would certainly not be greatly honoring this excellent elephant, nor would we be treating him fitly. In our view we should honor him by carrying out his wishes" (*na khalv evaṃ asmābhir iyaṃ dviradavaraḥ sampūjitaḥ satkṛto vā syāt / abhiprāyasampādanena tv ayam asmābhir yuktaḥ pūjayitum iti paśyāmaḥ*).¹¹⁴ The elephant, of course, was the Buddha himself in a former existence, so his remarks in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* passage had a long pedigree. They also continued to be cited in mainstream sources.

Yet another Sanskrit version of the same remarks is cited, for example, in the *Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa* in the following form:

mahāparinirvāṇāsūtre uktam. āgātā ānanda devā divyāni ca candanacūrmāni grhya divyāni ca māṇḍāravāṇi puṣpāṇi divyāni ...[na] ...nanda evaṃ tathāgataḥ satkṛto bhavati gurukṛto mānito vā pūjito vā. yaḥ punaḥ kaścid ānanda mama śāsane 'pramatto viharati ...ā ...kurute dharmaṃ dhārayati. tenāhaṃ satkṛto gurukṛto mānitaḥ pūjito bhavāmi.

Which in spite of the lacunae Lévi was able to translate as:

Il est dit dans le MahāParinirvāṇasūtra: Les dieux sont arrivés, ô Ānanda, prenant des poudres de santal célestes et des fleurs célestes de māṇḍārava ... [a negative must be inserted here] ... O Ānanda, c'est ainsi que le Tathāgata est honoré, respecté, vénéré, adoré. Celui que se comporte sans négligence, ô Ānanda, dans ma doctrine, qui fait ..., qui maintient la Loi, c'est celui-là qui, m'honore, me respecte, me vénère, m'adore.¹¹⁵

Once again it seems then that the position taken by the author of our early 'mahāyāna' polemic is the same position that is firmly embedded in a primary mainstream source that had a long life and broad circulation. This is not to say that something like what we see in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* and in the polemic now found in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* does not occur in other mahāyāna sources. It does, but it occurs only in a narrow band of the enormous spectrum of extant mahāyāna *sūtras*. It occurs, for example, in texts like the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* – neither of which appears to be particularly early – but already in an advanced or at least elaborated form. Both texts, for example, insist on the primacy of *pratipatti* over *pūjā*, but both also do so in part by developing the concept of *dharmapūjā* "the worship of Dharma". The *Vimalakīrti* declares "le culte de la loi (*dharmapūjā*) est le meilleur parmi tous les cultes", *chos kyi mchod pa ni mchod pa thams cad kyi nang na mchog go*;¹¹⁶ the *Samādhirāja* says *pratipatti dharmeṣv iha dharmapūjā*, "practice in the Dharmas – here is the worship of the Dharma".¹¹⁷ There is, however, no trace in our polemic of this sort of development, and only the slightest trace of the ideas that would quickly converge elsewhere to create the cult of the book. Our polemic is not yet pushing for an alternative cult form, and this, again, is probably just another indication of its early age and a certain indication that it is still very firmly in a mainstream group.

* * *

This essay could perhaps have been entitled – in conscious contradiction to Professor Hirakawa's old paper – "The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relationship to the Rejection of the Worship of *Stūpas*". But, apart perhaps from being moderately clever, where would that get us. Surely we are now beyond talking about 'the mahāyāna' as if it were a single monolithic thing, beyond using that very designation as anything other than a heuristic device – that at least is how I have tried to use the term here. But that must also mean, and that is starting to come clear, that we are also well beyond – or should be – looking for single causes for the emergence or 'rise' of what is clearly not a single thing. The best reason for not using such a title

may, however, be that if there is any 'relationship' of the polemic found in the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* to the "rise of mahāyāna Buddhism" that relationship remains a mystery. This early 'mahāyāna' polemic does not seem to be connected to the 'rise' of anything, but rather to the continuity and persistence of a narrow set of conservative Buddhist ideas on cult and monastic practice. That is all.¹¹⁸

NOTES

¹ An exception to this might be Atīsa's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya* (Derge, No. 3961) which quotes extensively from the *Maitreyamahāsīmhanāda-sūtra* as is clear from the unpublished paper by Mochizuki Kaie, "Atīsha no 'Daikyōshū' ni in'yo sareru kyōron" presented at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Nihon Indogaku Bukkyō Gakkai, 11 June 1995, at Hanazono University, Kyoto (I owe my knowledge of this paper to the kindness of J. Silk). The problem, of course, is knowing what, if any, influence this late anthology had in India.

² P. Demiéville, "Butsuzō", *Hōbōgirin*, Troisième fascicule (Paris: 1974) 210–215, esp. 213.

³ P. Demiéville, "L'iconoclasme anti-bouddhique en chine", *Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à Henri-Charles Puech* (Paris: 1974) 17–25; esp. 21.

⁴ E. Zürcher, "Buddhist Art in Medieval China: The Ecclesiastical View", in *Function and Meaning in Buddhist Art. Proceedings of a Seminar held at Leiden University 21–24 October 1991*, ed. K. R. van Kooij and H. van der Veere (Groningen: 1995) 1–20; esp. 8–9 and n. 57; 11.

⁵ J. A. Silk, *The Origins and Early History of the Mahāratnakūṭa Tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism with a Study of the Ratnarāśīsūtra and Related Materials*, PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1994; 78–79; 94–95; 154–55; 198–99; 213–14; etc.

⁶ P. Demiéville, H. Durt, and A. Seidel, *Répertoire du canon bouddhique sino-japonais. Fascicule annexe du Hōbōgirin* (Paris/Tōkyō: 1978) no. 310.23 and 249, s.v. Gatsubashuna; see also P. C. Bagchi, *Le canon bouddhique en chine. Les traducteurs et les traductions*. T. I. (Paris: 1927) 265–67; 431; Zürcher, "Buddhist Art in Medieval China", 16 n. 57 gives the title as "The Assembly of Mahākāśyapa". The fact that one title refers to Maitreya and the other to Mahākāśyapa may be connected to the structure and therefore, perhaps, to the history of the text as we have it: in the first half of the text as we have it, at least in the Tibetan translation, the main character is the Bodhisattva Maitreya, while in the second half it is Mahākāśyapa, and the exact relationship between the two halves is not yet clear.

⁷ For the Tibetan text I was able to use that found at Tog, *dkon rtsegs* Ca 148b.7–218b.5; Derge, *dkon rtsegs* Ca 68a.1–114b.7; and – thanks to P. Harrison – fragments of at least two copies of the text from Tabo. Unfortunately, the catalog for the Tabo material is not yet in final form nor the identification of all the fragments firm. Suffice it to say here that Running Number (= RN) 260 contains at least 13 folios of the *Maitreyamahāsīmhanāda*; RN 261 contains 5; and RN 263, contrary to expectations, none – the folio in 263 marked as the *Maitreyamahāsīmhanāda* (Ga-Ma 47) actually contains the *Adhyāśayasamcodana*. Since the amount of text on a Tabo folio is almost twice the amount on a Tog folio this means that almost half the text has been identified in the Tabo fragments. Since too in at least three places the same text is found on two fragments it is certain that there were at least two copies of the text at Tabo – (On the Tabo fragments see at least: E. Steinkellner, "A Report on the 'Kanjur' of Ta pho", *East and West* 44.1 (1994) 115–36; E. De Rossi Filibeck, "A

Study of a Fragmentary Manuscript of the *Pañcaviṃśatikā* in the Ta pho Library”, ibid, 137–55 and figs 10–17; J. L. Panglung, “New Fragments of the *sGra-sbyor bam-po gñis pa*”, ibid, 161–72; H. Tauscher, “Tanjur Fragments from the Manuscript Collection at Ta pho Monastery. *Sambandhaparīkṣa* with its Commentaries *Vṛtti* and *Tīkā*”, ibid, 173–84; also D. E. Klimburg-Salter, *Tabo. A Lamp for the Kingdom. Early Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Art in the Western Himalaya* (New York: 1998), the bibliography of which lists a number of forthcoming works). The textual tradition preserved in the Tabo fragments does not appear to be uniform. In some cases it may represent an early and important ‘variant’ tradition; in others not. Unfortunately, the latter is true for the *Maitreyasimhanāda*. Apart from orthographic differences, the Tabo fragments contain few, if any, significant variants, and a significant number of ‘scribal errors’. – Although the Tibetan title of the text is the same in Tog, Derge, and Tabo, each gives a slightly different Sanskrit title: Tog has *Ārya-maitreya-mahā-siṃha-nādana*, Derge *Ārya-maitreya-mahā-siṃha-nāda*, and Tabo RN 260, Ga-Na 58 *Ārya-maitreya-mahā-siṃha-nādan*.

⁸ M. Lalou, “Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi khri-sroṅ-lde-bcan”, *JA* (1953) 320; *Bde bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi 'byung gnas gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod* (L. Chandra, *The Collected Works of Bu-ston* (Śatapiṭaka 64) (New Delhi: 1971) Vol. 24 (Ya)) 4b.4 (cf. D. Martin, *Tibetan Histories. A Bibliography of Tibetan-Language Historical Works* (London: 1997) 50–51) – I shall use this short title throughout.

⁹ Zürcher, “Buddhist Art in Medieval China”, 11.

¹⁰ The relationship of the various parts of the text as we have it in its Tibetan translation remains to be determined, see above n. 6 and below.

¹¹ Tog Ca 208b.2–.4 = Derge Ca 107b.5–.7 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 90a.6–.8.

¹² Demiéville, “Butsuzō”, 213; Zürcher, “Buddhist Art in Medieval China”, 8.

¹³ The position taken in regard to the use of images and paintings in this section of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* might, for example, fruitfully be discussed in connection with the remarks in Pāṇini and Patañjali on religious images as “a source of livelihood” (see H. Von Stietencron, “Orthodox Attitudes towards Temple Service and Image Worship in Ancient India”, *Central Asiatic Journal* 21 (1977) 126–38; P.-S. Filliozat, “La conception de l’image divine dans la *Mahābhāṣya* de Patañjali”, in *Langue, style et structure dans le monde indien. Centenaire de Louis Renou*, éd. N. Balbir and G.-J. Pinault (Paris: 1996) 199–212), and – further afield – the monastic debate about art in 12th century Europe (see M. Casey and J. Leclercq, *Cistercians and Cluniacs. St. Bernard’s Apologia to Abbot William* (Kalamazoo: 1970); C. Rudolph, “The ‘Principal Founders’ and the Early Artistic Legislation of Cîteaux”, in *Studies in Cistercian Art and Architecture*, Vol. III, ed. M. P. Lillich (Kalamazoo: 1987) 1–45; C. Rudolph, *The “Things of Greater Importance”. Bernard of Clairvaux’s Apologia and the Medieval Attitude Toward Art* (Philadelphia: 1990).)

¹⁴ For the canonical *Vinaya* see *Vinayottaragrantha*, Derge, ‘*dul ba* Pa 137b.4, and Pa 175b.1–177b.7; both passages have been digested by Guṇaprabha (R. Sankrityayana, *Vinayasūtra of Bhadanta Guṇaprabha* (Singhi Jain Śāstra Śikṣāpīṭha Series – 74) (Bombay: 1981) 120.23–121.12) providing the basic Sanskrit vocabulary underlying the Tibetan translation of the *Uttaragrantha*. And both passages have again been presented in abbreviated form by Bu-ston in his ‘*Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo* (L. Chandra, *The Collected Works of Bu-ston* (Śatapiṭaka Series 63) (New Delhi: 1971) Vol. 23 (Ha), 417b.5ff); for some brief remarks on this work see G. Schopen, “Marking Time in Buddhist Monasteries. On Calendars, Clocks, and Some Liturgical Practices”, in *Sūryacandrāya. Essays in Honour of Akira Yuyama on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday* (Indica et Tibetica 35), ed. P. Harrison and G. Schopen (Swisttal-Odendorf: 1998) 178 n. 67. See also n. 17 below.

¹⁵ A. L. Basham, “The Evolution of the Concept of the Bodhisattva”, in *The*

Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism, ed. L. S. Kawamura (Waterloo: 1981) 19–59, esp. 29–30; G. Schopen, “On Monks, Nuns and ‘Vulgar’ Practices: The Introduction of the Image Cult into Indian Buddhism”, *Artibus Asiae* 49 (1988/89) 153–68 (= *BSBM* 238–257).

¹⁶ See, for example, Schopen, “On Monks, Nuns, and ‘Vulgar’ Practices”, 155ff [= *BSBM* 240ff]; Schopen, “Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism. The Laymen/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit”, *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1985) 26ff (= *BSBM* 32ff).

¹⁷ This section of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* will be treated in some detail as one chapter in a work in progress tentatively entitled *Beauty and the Business of a Buddhist Monk. Various Voices in a Monastic Debate about Art, Property, and Acquisition in Kuṣān North India*. The passages on monastic image processions in the *Uttaragrantha* referred to in n. 14 will be treated in another chapter.

¹⁸ H. Durt, “Daijō”, *Hōbōgirin*, Septième Volume (Paris/Kyoto: 1994) 778; see also P. Harrison, “Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle? Self Image and Identity among the Followers of the Early Mahāyāna”, *JIAS* 10 (1987) 67–84, esp. 72–73. – J. Nattier has pointed out to me that it is far more historically accurate to say that ‘mahāyāna’ is a paraphrase of ‘bodhisattvayāna’, not vice versa.

¹⁹ Tog Ca 217a.3–7 = Derge Ca 113b.6–114a.1 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 94b.8.

²⁰ There is a similar though much shorter polemic in the first half of the text dealing with what its author clearly considered to be unsavory aspects of the monastic practice of begging – Tog Ca 164b.5ff = Derge Ca 78a.6ff = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 69a.1, though only the end of the polemic is preserved in the Tabo fragments.

²¹ Tog Ca 183a.5 = Derge Ca 90b.1 = Tabo, not available.

²² For more on the “works” of a monk and a fuller citation of the Tibetan for this passage see p. 288ff of this paper.

²³ Tog Ca 205b.1 = Derge Ca 105b.4 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 88b.3, RN 261, 28a.3.

²⁴ The issue does however arise at least once in a fairly mild form in the first half of the text. There one of the twenty things a bodhisattva should do (*nyi shu po ‘di dag ni byang chub sems dpa’ rnam kyi las yin te*) is *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa la dga’ ba’i sems yid la mi bya ba*, “He should not fix in mind a thought which delights in the Vehicle of the Disciples and Non-teaching Buddhas” (Tog Ca 175b.3ff = Derge Ca 85b.7 = Tabo, RN 260 Ga-Na 72b.3. Still more subtle is the very interesting passage which – without any reference to ‘vehicles’ – has Kaśyapa decline, because of his self-avowed limitations, to take responsibility for the maintenance of the Dharma in the future and to insist that the assignment be given to a bodhisattva (*bcom ldan ‘das bdag ni nyi tshe bar spyod pa nyi tshe ba’i shes pa dang ldan pa lags pas de lta bu’i khur ‘deg pa’i rngo mi thog lags kyi / bcom ldan ‘das byang chub sems dpas ni de lta bu’i khur ‘deg par rngo thog lags so /* – Tog Ca 160a.6 = Derge Ca 75b.2 = Tabo, not available. Here the text is cited from Derge; Tog appears to be faulty). But this passage too is from the first half of the text.

²⁵ Tog Ca 206a.5–b.2 = Derge Ca 106a.5–7 = Tabo, RN 261, 28b.1 – Note that Tog has *dge slong gi las* instead of *dge sbyong gi las* here, but two lines later in concluding the same section it – like Derge and Tabo – also uses *dge sbyong*

²⁶ *Divyāvadāna* 488.2.

²⁷ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, “Notes on the *Divyāvadāna*”, *JRAS* (1950) 166–84; (1951) 82–102. In his introductory remarks Bailey says: “In making use of the Ḥḍul ba for a systematic revision of the *Divyāvadāna* text ... account would have to be taken of two further conclusions which emerge from a careful reading. The first is that *some* of the *Divyāvadāna* tales are deliberate abridgements of the Vinaya narratives, often very clumsily carried out ... Ralston’s translation of the Māndhātṛ

story as it stands in the *Ḥdul ba* provides a smoothly flowing narrative which has been abbreviated to the point of incomprehensibility in the Sanskrit of Cowell and Neil's edition . . .” Though of the same nature, the situation is perhaps even worse in regard to the *Cūdāpakṣa* where numerous key narrative elements have been entirely omitted in the “very clumsily carried out” abridgement found in the *Divyāvadāna*.

²⁸ Derge, ‘*dul ba* Ja 64b.4 – Almost all of the versions of this formula I have collected are in Tibetan so this particular case is especially important since it establishes the Sanskrit that is behind these other versions. Especially important for getting at an Indian understanding of the assertion presented in the formula is the equivalence *karma* = *las*. Given the frequent overlap in both vocabulary and rule between Buddhist *Vinaya* and Indian *Dharmaśāstra* and *Dharmasūtra*, it seems very likely that the statement *dve bhikṣukarmaṇī* would have been taken as parallel in kind to the repeated assertion that there are six lawful “occupations” for a brahmin (*Āpastambha* II.5.10, 4; *Gautama* VIII.10; X.1–2; *Manu* I.88, X.75; *Yājñavalkya* I.118 etc.). This suggestion might find some support from the fact that the compilers of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* seem to have been familiar with the brahmanical assertion – see, for example, *Kṣudrakavastu*, Derge ‘*dul ba* Tha 56b.3ff where a brahmanical family is twice described as *bram ze las drug la brston pa*, “diligent in the six occupations of a brahmin”; *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Ca 170a.5 where exactly the same thing is said; or C. Vogel and K. Wille, “Some More Fragments of the Pravrajyāvastu Portion of the Vinayavastu Manuscript Found Near Gilgit”, in *Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon: Neuentdeckungen und Neueditionen*, Zweite Folge (Göttingen: 1992) 76.9 (96), 80.33 (106).

²⁹ *Vibhaṅga*, Derge ‘*dul ba* Ca 123a.5; 129b.7, 265b.1; etc.

³⁰ *Kṣudraka*, Tog, ‘*dul ba* Ta 185b.4 = Derge, ‘*dul ba* Tha 121b.7 = ‘*Dul ba pha*’i gleng ‘*bum chen mo*, ‘A 411b.3 – Here both the canonical text and Bu-ston have *dge slong gi bya ba* . . ., using *bya ba* instead of *las*.

³¹ *Kṣudraka*, Tog, ‘*dul ba* Ta 265a.4 = Derge, ‘*dul ba* Tha 175b.2 = ‘*Dul ba pha*’i gleng ‘*bum chen mo*, ‘A 397a.2.

³² It should be noted that for the moment the formula *dve bhikṣukarmaṇī dhyānam adhyayanam ca* appears to be characteristically *Mūlasarvāstivādin* – it has been noted so far only in literature connected with this group or with this *Vinaya*. To what degree this will continue to hold true as other sources – especially *Vinaya* sources – are investigated remains, of course, to be seen. But one thing, at least, seems already to be relatively sure: the assertion in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* that “there are two occupations for a monk” has no apparent connection to the already divisive distinction noted long ago in the Pāli *Nikāyas* by de La Vallée Poussin between “deux catégories de moines” and “les moines qui pratiquent le recueillement ou extase (les *jhāyins*)” and “les moines qui s’attachent à la doctrine (les *dhammayogas*)” (L. de La Vallée Poussin, “Extase et Spéculation (*Dhyāna* et *Prajñā*)”, in *Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman* (Cambridge, MA: 1929) 135–36; de La Vallée Poussin, “Musila et Nārada. Le Chemin du Nirvāṇa”, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1936–37) 189ff); nor to the distinction – also divisive – between *ganthadhuras* (‘scholars’) and *vipassanādhuras* (‘meditators’) found in the Pāli commentaries (W. Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo: 1956) 158ff), and even in Sri Lankan inscriptions (R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, *Robe and Plough. Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka* (Tucson: 1979) 139ff). In the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* meditation and recitation are indeed presented as two alternatives or two possible options, and individuals are generally presented as choosing one or the other. But it is equally clear that they are not (yet) mutually exclusive options, and there are a number of cases in which individuals choose to pursue both. In the case of Mahāpanthaka cited above, when asked which of the two he will do (. . . *kiṃ kariṣyasi*), he responds “I will do both” (*ubhayaṃ kariṣyāmi*),

and does so; exactly the same thing happens in yet another *Vibhaṅga* text at Derge 'dul ba Ca 265b.1; and there are even cases where the disciple of a monk who pursues one option elects to pursue the other (Derge, 'dul ba Ca 229b.7). Moreover, there is no indication that in this *Vinaya* one option was considered better or worse than the other, and no indication that there was any serious ideological antagonism between groups of monks who pursued one or the other. The closest thing to any antagonism might well be the mildly amusing account at *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, GMs iii 1, 56.20–57.18 (= Derge 'dul ba Kha 151a.2–151b.2) of a *prāhāṇika* monk who was repeatedly reborn as a frog because he once said that a group of recitative-monks (*svādhyāyakāraka*) who disturbed his concentration sounded like a bunch of croaking frogs. – These considerations too point, it seems, towards understanding the assertion that there are two occupations of a monk as parallel in kind to the assertion that there are six occupations for a brahmin; see above n. 28.

³³ Tog Ca 184a.1–4 = Derge Ca 91a.1–3 = Tabo, not available.

³⁴ This passage will be discussed further pp. 303ff of this paper.

³⁵ *Cīvaravastu*, GMs iii 2, 120.3 = Tog 'dul ba Kha 134a.3 = Derge Ga 102a.3 = 'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo A 290b.2. The account in which the passage occurs is translated in G. Schopen, "Deaths, Funerals, and the Division of Property in a Monastic Code", in *Buddhism in Practice*, ed. D. S. Lopez, Jr. (Princeton: 1995) 496–97; see also 483.

³⁶ *Śayanāsana* (Gnoli) 36.6 = Tog, 'dul ba Ga 285b.1 = Derge, 'dul ba Ga 210a.7 = 'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo 'A 263b.1 (the latter, incidentally, paraphrases the formula as *klog pa dang bsam gtan las nyams de* ... almost as if it were conflating our two formulae.

³⁷ *Kṣudraka*, Tog, 'dul ba Ta 368b.2 = Derge, 'dul ba Tha 247a.6.

³⁸ Further examples of this formula occur at *Pāṇḍulohitakavastu*, GMs iii 3, 11.17; 12.17; 13.4; 14.12; *Vibhaṅga*, Derge 'dul ba Ca 39b.4; *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga*, Derge 'dul ba Ta 264b.5 (see also Ta 286b.3); etc.

³⁹ What looks like a version of the *riñcanti uddeśaṃ pāṭham*, etc. formula also occurs in the Pāli *Vinaya*, but very rarely. Horner has noted two instances, Pāli *Vinaya* i 190.5 (*riñcanti uddeśaṃ paripucchaṃ adhisīlaṃ adhiccitaṃ adhipaññaṃ* – repeated several times) and iii 235 (exactly the same form repeated twice.) Given the degree of variation these Pāli *Vinaya* passages almost certainly could not have been the source for the passage in our polemic. Moreover there is absolutely no evidence that might suggest that the Pāli *Vinaya* was ever known in Northwest India, the area in which – as we will see – other evidence might place our polemic.

⁴⁰ See references in n. 31 above – the initial announcement of the five blessings actually occurs a few leaves prior: Tog, 'dul ba Ta 261a.4 = Derge, 'dul ba Tha 172b.6.

⁴¹ *Śayanāsana* (Gnoli) 37.27 = Tog, 'dul ba Ga 287a.2 = Derge, 'dul ba Ga 212a.1; *Cīvaravastu*, GMs iii 2, 101.7 = Tog, 'dul ba Ga 121a.2 = Derge, 'dul ba Ga 94a.2.

⁴² There are, however, other instances in mahāyāna *sūtra* literature where elements of these two formulae appear to have been used in polemical contexts, e.g. *Rāṣṭrapāla* 31.1: *dhyānaṃ tathādhyāyanaṃ tyaktvā nitya vihāra karmaṇi niyuktāḥ* / ... (on the well-known passage in which this occurs and which has been called "un tableau satirique des mœurs relâchées du clergé buddhique", among other things, see L. Finot, *Rāṣṭrapālaparipucchā. Sūtra du Mahāyāna* (St. Petersburg: 1901) ix–xi; L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Bouddhisme. Notes et Bibliographie", *Le Muséon*, n.s.4 (1903) 307; Ét. Lamotte, "Sur la formation du mahāyāna", in *Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller* (Leipzig: 1954) 379; etc.).

⁴³ Tog Ca 206b.1–3 = Derge Ca 106a.7–b.1 = Tabo, RN 261, 28b.3–4.

⁴⁴ But note the variant in Tog cited above in n. 25.

⁴⁵ Even within the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* there is – as there almost always is

with formulae there – a certain amount of variation: where, for example, the *Cīvara* has *riñcanty uddeśaṃ pāṭhaṃ svādhyāyaṃ yogaṃ manasikāraṃ*, the *Pāṇḍulohitaka* repeatedly has *riñcanty uddeśaṃ pāṭhaṃ svādhyāyaṃ yogaṃ manasikāraṃ adhyātmaṃ cetaḥsamatham*.

⁴⁶ Ét. Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien. Des origines à l'ère Śaka* (Louvain: 1958) 727.

⁴⁷ See for two very different kinds of examples A. M. Quagliotti, “*Mahākāruṇika*”, *Annali* 49 (1989) 349, 360 (her reference to Lamotte (1967) 165 is, of course, wrong – the only work of Lamotte that she lists under “references” is *Histoire*); J. W. de Jong, review of Falk, *Schrift im alten Indien*, in *IJJ* 39 (1996) 69.

⁴⁸ Ét. Lamotte, “*Vajrapāṇi en Inde*”, in *Mélanges de sinologie offerts à M. Paul Demiéville* (Paris: 1966) 113–59.

⁴⁹ Lamotte, “*Vajrapāṇi en Inde*”, 121; 135.

⁵⁰ P. Demiéville, *JA* (1950) 375–95; esp. 378 and n. 2; 382 [= P. Demiéville, *Choix d'études bouddhiques (1929–1970)* (Leiden: 1973) 473 and n. 2; 477]. Demiéville attributes this view to Lamotte but the situation is a bit more complicated. See Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*. t.I (Louvain: 1944) 104 n. 2 (“Nous avons déjà remarqué à plusieurs reprises [e.g. 88 n. 1] que le Mppś, quand il cite d'une manière vague ‘le Vinaya’, se réfère presque toujours au Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin . . .”); Lamotte, *Le traité* . . . t. II. (Louvain: 1949) xv (“On a constaté, au cours du tome précédent . . . que *Le Traité* utilise, de préférence à tous les autres, les Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin et des Mūlasarvāstivādin. Le présent tome également a fréquemment recours au second . . .”). And see next note.

⁵¹ Ét. Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, t. III (Louvain: 1970) xviii – Lamotte then goes on to cite, “à titre d'exemple”, fifteen examples. He also says in effect here that *Le traité* depends on the *Sarvāstivādin* for the technical matters of *vinaya* but on the *Mūlasarvāstivādin* for its extensive narrative accounts.

⁵² Lamotte, *Le traité*, t. III, xi; see also ix: “D’après les indications fournies par l’auteur, il semble avoir exercé son activité au début du IV^e siècle de notre ère, dans le Nord-Ouest de l’Inde”.

⁵³ R. Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu*, Part I (Serie Orientale Roma, XLIX.1) (Rome: 1971) xx n. 1.

⁵⁴ Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu*, xix.

⁵⁵ This evidence will be treated in some detail in the work in progress mentioned in n. 17 above.

⁵⁶ For the positions taken in regard to relics in these sources see, for the *Saddharma*, the now very old G. Schopen, “The Phrase ‘*sa prthivīpradeśaś caityabhūto bhavet*’ in the *Vajracchedikā*: Notes on the Cult of the Book in Mahāyāna”, *IJJ* 17 (1975) 147–81; esp. 163ff (for some recent remarks on this piece see T. Vetter, “On the Origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Subsequent Introduction of *Prajñāpāramitā*”, *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 48.4 (1994) 1241–81; esp. 1266ff, although I, at least, am not always able to follow his arguments); G. Schopen, “The Five Leaves of the *Buddhabalādhānaprātihāryavikurvāṇanirdeśa-sūtra* found at Gilgit”, *JIP* 5 (1978) 319–36 – which contains a particularly ugly translation; J. Nobel, *Suvarṇabhāṣottamasūtra. Das Goldglanz-Sūtra. Ein Sanskrittext des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus* (Leipzig: 1937) Ch. 2.

⁵⁷ This past Buddha is called *me tog sna tshogs* in Tibetan. Puṣpavicitra is only my guess as to what the Sanskrit might have been.

⁵⁸ Tog Ca 201b.1 = Derge Ca 102b.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁵⁹ Y. N. Roerich, *Tibetan–Russian–English Dictionary* 10 (Moscow: 1987) 65.

⁶⁰ D. T. Suzuki, *An Index to the Lankavatara Sutra* (Nanjio Edition) (Kyoto: 1934)

121; Y. Ejima, *Index to the Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra – Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese* (Tokyo: 1990) fasc. 7, 693.

⁶¹ See most recently G. Fussman, “L’indo-grec Ménandre ou Paul Demiéville revisité”, *JA* (1993) 61–138; esp. 95ff., and the literature cited.

⁶² Tog Ca 201b.2 = Derge Ca 103a.1 = Tabo, not available.

⁶³ Tog Ca 205b.3 = Derge Ca 105b.6 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 88b.5; RN 261, 28a.4.

⁶⁴ R. Salomon, “The Inscription of Senavarma, King of Oḍi”, *IJJ* 29 (1986) 261–93; esp. 265,7a–b; 270; 278; also G. Fussman, “Documents épigraphiques kouchans (III). L’inscription kharoṣṭhī de Senavarma, roi d’oḍi: une nouvelle lecture”, *BEFEO* 71 (1982) 1–46; esp. 4,7a–b; 8; 25 – it is very likely that a -vimuti- has been scribally omitted and that the intended reading was *samasipraṇāvimuti[vimuti]ñāṇadra(śa)paribhāvita*.

⁶⁵ G. Fussman, “Nouvelles inscriptions śaka (II)”, *BEFEO* 73 (1984) 31–46; esp. 39.

⁶⁶ G. Schopen, “Burial ‘ad sanctos’ and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism. A Study in the Archaeology of Religions”, *Religion* 17 (1987) 193–225; esp. 205 (= *BSBM* 126–27) – Note that the chapter in the *Buddhacarita* in which these passages occur is not preserved in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit equivalents are Johnston’s. On the Tibetan translation see now D. P. Jackson, “On the Date of the Tibetan Translation of Aśvaghōṣa’s *Buddhacarita*”, *Studia Indologica* 4 (1997) 41–62.

⁶⁷ On the inscription of Senavarma Salomon says: “the inscription can be securely dated to the early Kuṣāṇa era, i.e. about the first half of the 1st century A.D.” (p. 261 of work cited in n. 64 above); Fussman: “La date de l’inscription (entre 20 et 40 de n.è) étant assurée par son contenu ...” (p. 9 of work cited in n. 64). The second inscription is dated “en l’an quatre-vingt-trois du roi Azès dont le temps est passé” = 25/26 A.D., so Fussman, *BEFEO* 73 (1984) 39.

⁶⁸ E.H. Johnston, *The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha* Part II (Calcutta: 1936) xvii.

⁶⁹ Not securely, of course, and largely, it seems, on the basis of the date of the earliest Chinese translation.

⁷⁰ The closest thing to the expression in the Inscription of Senavarma that I know occurs in a 5th Century inscription from Sāñchī where *śīla-samādhi-prajñā-guṇa-bhāvitendriyāya* is applied to the local saṅgha (J. Marshall et al. *The Monuments of Sāñchī* (Delhi: 1940) Vol. 1, 388. – It is worth noting too that the *Maitreyasīṃhanāda* – like other texts in the *Ratnakūṭa* – also refers to monastic robes as “pervaded with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release” using exactly the same formula (*bcom ldan ‘das kyis bka’ stsal pa / ‘od srungs de bzhin du nga’i gos ngur smrig tshul khrims dang / ting nge ‘dzin dang / shes rab dang / mam par grol ba dang / mam par grol ba’i ye shes mthong bas bsgos pa gang dag yin pa ...* Tog Ca 207b.2 – On this and similar passages elsewhere, see Silk, *The Origins and Early History of the Mahāratnakūṭa ...* (n. 5 above) 77ff). The fact that relic and robe are described in the same way is not so surprising in light of what especially mahāyāna sources say about the sacrality of the monastic robe. Although its Indian background has yet to be studied see, for example, B. Faure, “Quand l’habit fait le moine: The Symbolism of the *Kāṣāya* in Sōtō Zen”, *Cahiers d’extrême-asie* 8 (1995) 335–69, one section of which is entitled “The Robe as Relic”. Also not surprising – but yet another indicator of the essential ‘identity’ of the relics of the Buddha and the Buddha himself – is the fact that our polemic also describes the body (*sku*) of the Buddha in exactly the same way: *gros po dag de bzhin gshegs pa’i sku ni tshul khrims dang / ting nge ‘dzin dang / shes rab dang / mam par grol ba dang / mam par grol ba’i ye shes mthong bas*

yongs su bsgos pa yin pas ... Tog Ca 204a.7 = Derge Ca 104b.7 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 88a.2. And the same passage goes on to say that his body is – like his relics according to Aśvaghōṣa – also “prevaded with universal benevolence” (*byams pa*); etc.

⁷¹ Johnston, *Buddhacarita*, Pt. 2, xiii.

⁷² See at least S. Lévi, “Notes sur les indo-scythes”, *JA* (1986) 444–84; Lévi, “Açvaghōṣa. Le *Sūtrālamkāra* et ses sources”, *JA* (1908) 57–184; Lévi, “Encore Açvaghōṣa”, *JA* (1928) 193–216; Lévi, “Autour d’Açvaghōṣa”, *JA* (1929) 255–85; Lévi, “Kāṇṣka et Śātavāhana. Deux figures symboliques de l’inde au premier siècle”, *JA* 63–121; see also L. Renou “Sylvain Lévi et son oeuvre scientifique”, in *Mémorial Sylvain Lévi* (Paris: 1937) xi–li esp. xx–xx1; xxx–xxx1; xxxix–xi.

⁷³ L. Renou, *Les Littératures de l’inde* (Paris: 1966) 58, although he then immediately adds “... mais sur la vie duquel on ne sait rien de précis (on le croit né à Ayodhyā, mod. Oudh)”.

⁷⁴ Johnston, *Buddhacarita*, Pt. 2, xv.

⁷⁵ On specific points of contact or commonality between this *Vinaya* and ‘brahmanical’ ideas see G. Schopen, “On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure. Monastic Funerals in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*”, *JIP* 20 (1992) 1–39 (= *BSBM* 204–37); Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Written Loan Contracts in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114.4 (1994) 527–54; Schopen, ‘Monastic Law meets the Real World: A Monk’s Continuing Right to Inherit Family Property in Classical India’, *History of Religions* 35.2 (1995) 101–23 – But there are in addition scores of passages in this *Vinaya* that indicate its compilers’ knowledge of and adjustment to a ‘brahmanical milieu’; see as a sample: the passages in the *Kṣudraka* and *Vibhaṅga* cited in n. 28 above where brahmanical families are described as ‘diligent in the six occupations of a brahmin’; the rules in the *Kṣudraka* (Tog ‘*dul ba* Ta 8b.4) against monks wearing “sacred threads” (*tshangs pa’i skud*) or (Ta 4b.3) *triśūla* marks (*so ris gsum*); the rules in the *Kṣudraka* (Ta 164a.3) concerning the establishment of drinking facilities in the monastery and (Ta 337b.2) monks washing their bowls in such a way as to accommodate brahmanical concerns with purity; passages in the *Vibhaṅga* (Derge ‘*dul ba* Ca 246b.6ff; Ja 61a.4ff) which refer in some detail to brahmanical educational practices; the delightful story of the clever thief in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* (Gnoli) ii 32.4ff which refers to the components of a brahmanical funeral – even to the deposition of the bones in the Ganges (*asthīni gaṅgāyām prakṣeptavyāni*) – and to Kāpālikas; etc.

⁷⁶ See the overview in G. Fussman, “*Upāya-kauśalya*. L’implantation du bouddhisme au gandhāra”, in *Bouddhisme et cultures locales. Quelques cas de réciproques adaptations. Actes du colloque franco-japonais de septembre 1991*, éd. F. Fukui et G. Fussman (Paris: 1994) 17–51; esp. 39ff.

⁷⁷ The question of the place of origin of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* has, of course, been conflated with the question of the place of origin of “the *Prajñāpāramitā*”, and this has not been particularly helpful. Although Lamotte wanted to place both (?) in the North-West during the Kūṣāna period his suggestion has not gone unchallenged – for what it is worth see the discussion in E. Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, 2nd rev. ed. (Tokyo: 1978) 1–4; the discussion does not seem to have progressed much beyond this.

⁷⁸ Tog Ca 199a.6 = Derge Ca 101b.1 = Tabo, RN 261, 25a.1.

⁷⁹ Tog Ca 197a.2 = Derge Ca 99b.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁸⁰ *Rāṣṭrapāla* 39.3: ... *sarva eva purimā narottamā arāṇyagocararatāḥ*; 45.16: ... *prāptā hy arāṇyaniratena jinena bodhiḥ*. See also the verse from the *Samādhirāja* cited in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* 193.9: *na kaści buddhaḥ purimeṇa āsīd anāgato bheṣyati yo ’vatiṣṭhate / yehi sthitair eva agāramadhye prāptā iyaṃ uttama agrabodhiḥ*; etc.

– I refrain here and below from multiplying random references in the belief that what is needed now are systematic studies of this and other themes in the whole range of mahāyāna sūtra literature. The interesting discussion of the ‘forest ideal’ in R. Ray, *Buddhist Saints in India. A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations* (New York/Oxford: 1994) 251–92, is a good start, but almost entirely limited to those mahāyāna sūtras that have been translated.

⁸¹ Tog Ca 197b.2 = Derge Ca 100a.5 = Tabo, not available.

⁸² Tog Ca 197b.5 = Derge Ca 100a.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁸³ This is the title of the eleventh chapter of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. Bendall and Rouse render it as “Praise of the Forest Seculsion” (C. Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse, *Çikshā-Samuccaya. A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine* (London: 1992) 188).

⁸⁴ As a small sample see *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘dul ba Ta 57b.4–58b.1 = Derge, ‘dul ba Tha 39a.6–39b.5; Tog, ‘dul ba 154b.3–158a.3 = Derge, ‘dul ba Tha 102a.5–104b.2; Tog ‘dul ba Tha 50b.5–51b.2 = Derge ‘dul ba Da 35b.2–36a.2 etc.

⁸⁵ *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, GMs iii 1, 79.3ff = *Divyāvadāna* 80.11f.

⁸⁶ See Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord”, esp. 547–52.

⁸⁷ *Rāṣṭrapāla* 16.7: *eka viharati yathaiva khadgo; Samādhirāja* Ch. XIX.14: *khadgasamā vicarantimu loke*; Ch. XXIX.53: *advitīya khadgasama bhotha sadā* (on the simile see most recently K. R. Norman, “Solitary as Rhinoceros Horn”, *Buddhist Studies Review* 13.2 (1996) 133–42). For the *Maitreyasimhanāda* cf. Tog Ca 180a.5 = Derge Ca 88a.7 = Tabo, not available: ... *bdag ni gnas dang yul gcig yongs su ‘dzhin par mi bgyid kyi / bdag ni ri dags ltar kun tu rgyu bar bgyid pa* ...

⁸⁸ Tog Ca 189b.1 = Derge Ca 94b.5 = Tabo, not available: *rigs kyi bu rgyal po mu khyud ‘dis bsod nams kyi sbyin pa yongs su gtong ba gang yin pa de bas ni byang chub sems dpa’ dben par gnas pa zhig dgon pa dang / rab tu dgon pa dag na gnas shing se gol gtogs pa tsam zhig chos thams cad ni ma skyes pa’o zhes bzod pa thob pa gang yin pa de bsod nams kyi phung po ches che bar rig par bya’o /* – Underneath *chos thams cad ni ma skyes pa’o zhes bzod pa* must be some form of the expression *anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*.

⁸⁹ Tog Ca 185a.5 = Derge Ca 91b.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁹⁰ See references in n. 78.

⁹¹ I am not sure how to best understand *de ‘ang de dag gi yongs su mya ngan las ‘da’ ba’i bar gyi rgyur ‘gyur ba yin na* ... esp. *bar gyi rgyu*, and the translation here is more than usually tentative.

⁹² Tog Ca 206a.3–207a.2 = Derge Ca 106a.3–106b.5 = Tabo, RN 261, 28b.1–8.

⁹³ Both Tog and Derge read *kyi* and that may be correct. If that is so, the sense and translation would differ only very slightly: “... for the accumulation of roots of good of those deprived of wisdom”.

⁹⁴ Tog Ca 183b.5–184a.1 = Derge Ca 90b.5–91a.1 = Tabo, not available.

⁹⁵ See p. 288 of this paper and references in n. 33.

⁹⁶ E. Waldschmidt, *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Berlin: 1951) §36.3.

⁹⁷ S. Lévi, *Mahākarmavibhaṅga (La grande classification des actes) et Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa (Discussion sur le Mahā Karmavibhaṅga)* (Paris: 1932) 159.14 (text), 173–74 (translation) – see also C. B. Tripāthī, “Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa und Berliner Texte”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 10 (1966) 208–19; esp. 211–12.

⁹⁸ T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, *The Dīgha-Nikāya* (London: 1903) Vol. II, 141.20.

⁹⁹ See G. Schopen, “Monks and the Relic Cult in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*: An Old Misunderstanding in Regard to Monastic Buddhism”, in *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion in Honor of Jan Yün-Hua*, ed., K. Shinohara and G. Schopen (Oakville: 1991) 187–201 (= *BSBM* 99–113; this paper

has also now been translated into Japanese: “*Daihatsu Nehangyō ni okeru Biku to Ikotsu ni Girei: Shukke Bukkyō ni kansuru furuku Kara no gokai*”, *Otani Gakuhō* 76.1 (1996) 1–20).

¹⁰⁰ On the Tibetan translations of the compound or phrase see G. Schopen, “On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure”, 28 n. 38 (= *BSBM* 227 n. 38)

¹⁰¹ For some examples of the continuing use of *śarīra* in the singular to mean ‘body’ see *Saṅghabhedavastu* (Gnoli) i 198.2 (*yena rājā śuddhodana anāvṛtaṃ buddhaśarīraṃ paśyati* . . .); ii 93.21 (*jīvakāḥ kathayati: vajramayaśarīro bhagavān brhatkāyaś ca*); and the numerous instances in the *Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa* (Lévi) 157.20ff; 158.1, .8ff; 160.8ff (a quotation from a *Bodhimūlasūtra* which – as Lévi already noted – has a very close parallel in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* (see Tog, ‘*dul ba* Ta 73a.5–76a.1); etc.

¹⁰² V. Trenckner, *The Milindapañho* (London: 1880) 177.4ff; see Schopen, “Monks and the Relic Cult in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*”, 195ff (= *BSBM* 108ff).

¹⁰³ See M. D. Eckel, *To See the Buddha. A Philosopher’s Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness* (San Francisco: 1992) 90–94. Note too, for example, that the expression is twice used in the account of the last days of Mahākāśyapa in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, once in regard to the robe of the Buddha which Kāśyapa puts on just before he ‘dies’ and which is supposed to last/remain/endure until the arrival of Maitreya (. . . ‘*od srungs chen po . . . bsams pa / ma la bdag la bcom ldan ‘das kyis phyag dar khrod pa byin pa ‘di lus la bgos la / byams pa’i gsung rab rgyas kyi bar du byin gyis brlabs te* . . . Tog, ‘*dul ba* Tha 464b.5), and once in regard to Kāśyapa’s own body, which was also to endure (. . . *rang gi lus byin gyis brlabs nas* . . .) (This passage is quoted in Bu-ston’s *Bde bar gsheg pa’i bstan pa’i gsal byed chos kyi ‘byung gnas gsung rab rin po che’i mdzod*, Ya 85a.2; cf. E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyung) by Bu-ston* (Heidelberg: 1932) ii 86 where *byin gyis brlabs te* is translated “uttered a blessing” or “pronounced a blessing”. The expression seems to have disappeared in the Chinese translation – see J. Przyluski, “Le Nord-ouest de l’inde dans le vinaya des mūla-sarvāstivādin”, *JA* (1914) 524–25.

¹⁰⁴ See p. 295 of this paper and references in n. 62.

¹⁰⁵ Tog Ca 202b.4 = Derge Ca 103b.5 = Tabo, not available.

¹⁰⁶ Tog Ca 201a.4–.7 = Derge Ca 102b.4–.7 = Tabo, RN 261, 25b.9 (but only a very small part of the very beginning of the passage).

¹⁰⁷ Although it can now be supplemented in a number of ways see A. Bareau, “La construction et le culte des stūpa d’après les *vinayapiṭaka*”, *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 229–74 – For the Pāli *Vinaya* see G. Schopen, “The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pāli *Vinaya*”, *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 13 (1989) 83–100, esp. 89–93 (= *BSBM* 86–98, esp. 89–91) and Schopen, “The Ritual Obligations and Donor Roles of Monks in the Pāli *Vinaya*”, *ibid* 16 (1992) 98 n. 2 and the literature cited there (= *BSBM* 83 n. 14); Schopen, “The Suppression of Nuns and the Ritual Murder of their Special Dead in Two Buddhist Monastic Texts”, *JIP* 24 (1996) 563–92 – for the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* see next note.

¹⁰⁸ *Varṣāvastu*, GMs iii 4, 136.12–143.7 = Tog ‘*dul ba* Ka 343b.7–349b.6 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Ka 240b.6–244b.6; *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘*dul ba* Ta 352b.7–354a.5 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Tha 236a.2–237b.1; *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘*dul ba* Ta 185b.1–186a.4 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Tha 121b.6–122a.5; *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘*dul ba* Ta 6a.6–8a.1 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Tha 4a.7–5b.3; *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘*dul ba* Ta 154b.3–158a.3 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Tha 102a.5–104b.2; *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘*dul ba* Ta 180b.7–181a.4 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Tha 118b.7–119a.3; *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘*dul ba* Ta 279b.4–280a.2 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Tha 285b.2–285b.6; *Cīvaravastu*, GMs iii 2, 143.12 = Tog ‘*dul ba* Ga 149b.1 = Derge ‘*dul ba* Ga 113a.5; *Vibhaṅga*, Derge ‘*dul ba* Cha 210b.1ff and *Cīvaravastu*, GMs iii 2 145.13–146.6 = Tog ‘*dul ba* Ga 151a.2–.7 = Derge, ‘*dul ba* Ga 114a.6–114b.2; *Uttaragrantha*,

Derge, 'dul ba Pa 265a.6–266a.2; *Kṣudraka*, Tog 'dul ba Ta 265a.1–266a.2 = Derge 'dul ba Tha 175a.7–176a.3; *Kṣudraka*, Tog 'dul ba 96a.7–97b.1 = Derge 'dul ba Tha 64b.6–65b.2; *Kṣudraka*, Tog 'dul ba Ta 332a.4–335a.1 = Derge 'dul ba Tha 222b.2–224b.1 – In addition to these scattered references see also the sets of rules at *Kṣudraka*, Tog 'dul ba Ta 366b.6–368a.5 = Derge 'dul ba Tha 246a.4–247a.4 and *Uttaragrantha*, Derge 'dul ba Pa 114a.3ff and 119a.7 which are digested in *Vinayasūtra* 119.30–120.21 and presented again in 'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo, 'A 416a.2ff

¹⁰⁹ See p. 307 of this paper and references in n. 105.

¹¹⁰ *Dīgha* ii 138.16.

¹¹¹ See Bareau's translation of what he identifies as the Dharmaguptaka version of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*: "A ce moment, la divinité qui était entre les deux arbres jumeaux et qui avait une foi sincère en le Bouddha répandit sur le sol des fleurs écloses hors de saison. Le bienheureux dit alors à Ānanda: 'cette divinité des deux arbres jumeaux me fait offrande de fleurs écloses hors de saison, mais ce ne sont pas là des offrandes pour le Tathāgata'. Ānanda dit: 'Que nomme-t-on offrandes pour le Tathāgata?' Le Bouddha dit à Ānanda: 'Que des hommes reçoivent ma Doctrine et pratiquent ma Doctrine, c'est là ce que l'on nomme offrandes pour le Tathāgata'"; A. Bareau, *En Suivant bouddha* (Paris: 1985) 242–43.

¹¹² J. S. Speyer, *The Jātakamālā. Garland of Birth-Stories of Āryaśūra* (London: 1895) xxvii. The status of these "epilogues" is still not clear. Khoroché omits them from his recent translation saying – like many before him – that "they are probably by a later hand" (P. Khoroché, *Once the Buddha was a Monkey. Ārya Śūra's Jātakamālā* (Chicago: 1989) 255 n. 1), but to judge by the variants he cites they are already in his earliest manuscripts which appear to date to the 11th and 12th centuries (P. Khoroché, *Towards a New Edition of Ārya-Śūra's Jātakamālā (Indica et Tibetica 12)* (Bonn: 1987) 8–9; 15 (6.7, 6.9); 17 (18.22); 18 (22.9); 21 (33.12); 23 (40.20, 40.21, 40.23); etc.

¹¹³ H. Kern, *The Jātaka-Mālā or Bodhisattvāvadāna-Mālā by Ārya-Çūra* (Harvard Oriental Series 1) Boston: 1891) 207.12.

¹¹⁴ Khoroché, *Once the Buddha was a Monkey*, 219; Kern, *Jātaka-Mālā*, 206.16.

¹¹⁵ Lévi, *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* 159.3 (text), 173 (translation).

¹¹⁶ Ét. Lamotte, *L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti* (Bibliothèque du Muséon 51) (Louvain: 1962) 377; J. Oshika, "Tibetan Text of *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*", *Acta Indologica* 1 (1970) 235.18.

¹¹⁷ *Samādhirāja* V.20 – *pūjā*, its redefinition and reorientation are major preoccupations of the *Samādhirāja*. Three entire chapters – V, VI, and XXXIII – are almost totally concerned with these topics. See also at least II.8, 15; III.12; XI.43–47; XIII.26; XIV.40, 49, 54; XV.5, 7–9; XVII.9, 21, 50, 52, 53; XXIV.29–30, 55–59; XXV.3; XXIX.49–55, 114; XXXI.19–20; XXXII.135, 142, 165, 233, 236, 277–79; XXXV.3–.5, 68; XXXVI.14–15; XXXVII.2, 78–81.

¹¹⁸ I would like to thank Paul Harrison and Jan Nattier who, without necessarily agreeing with what I wrote, allowed me to benefit from their observations on it.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS CITED

BEFEO	= <i>Bulletin de l'école française d'extrême-orient</i>
BSBM	= G. Schopen, <i>Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks. Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India</i> (Honolulu: 1997)
Derge	= <i>The Tibetan Tripitaka. Taipei Edition</i> (Taipei: 1991)
GMs iii	= N. Dutt, <i>Gilgit Manuscripts</i> (Srinagar and Calcutta: 1942–50) Volume III, Parts 1–4
IJ	= <i>Indo-Iranian Journal</i>
JA	= <i>Journal Asiatique</i>
JIABS	= <i>Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies</i>
JIP	= <i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i>
<i>Rāṣṭrapāla</i>	= L. Finot, <i>Rāṣṭrapālapariṣcchā. Sūtra du mahāyāna</i> (Bibliotheca Buddhica II) (St. Petersburg: 1901)
<i>Samādhirāja</i>	= N. Dutt, <i>Gilgit Manuscripts</i> (Srinagar and Calcutta: 1942–50) Volume III, Parts 1–3
<i>Saṅghabhedavastu</i>	= R. Gnoli, <i>The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu. Being the 17th and Last Section of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin</i> (Serie Orientale Roma 49.1–2) (Rome: 1977–78) Parts I and II
<i>Śayanāsana</i>	= R. Gnoli, <i>The Gilgit Manuscript of the Śayanāsanavastu and the Adhikaraṇavastu. Being the 15th and 16th Sections of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin</i> (Serie Orientale Roma 50) (Rome: 1978)
<i>Śikṣāsamuccaya</i>	= C. Bendall, <i>Çikshāsamuccaya. A Compendium of Buddhist Teaching</i> (Bibliotheca Buddhica I) (St. Petersburg: 1897–1902)
Tabo	= Photographs of Two Fragmentary Manuscripts of the <i>Maitreyasīṃhanāda</i> found among the Tabo Manuscripts – see n. 7 above
Tog	= <i>The Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur</i> (Leh: 1979)

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